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ABSTRACT
Much of the legal scholarship on the preemption of state tort law in the food
and drug context and beyond has focused on issues of federalism. While the
literature has considered the relationship between state tort law and the
regulatory system, it has not generally explored the impact the federal
preemption of state tort law may have on women and people of color. Similarly,
while the literature has grappled with gender and racial justice issues in the tort
system, including in the context of tort reform, it has largely not examined the
gender and racial equity issues raised by federal preemption. This Article fills
this gap by examining how the federal preemption of state tort law may
perpetuate and even compound existing racial and gender inequities in the
context of cosmetics. It considers how tort law, coupled with appropriate federal
regulatory reform, may help lead to safer cosmetics for all.
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INTRODUCTION
The regulation of cosmetics is antiquated.1 Over the past eighty-four years,
the cosmetic provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)
have remained largely unchanged.2 During that time, however, Congress has
amended and strengthened the provisions for other products regulated by the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), including foods, drugs, and medical
devices.3
Recent events involving cosmetics have highlighted limitations of the current
regulatory framework for cosmetics.4 FDA’s authority with respect to cosmetics
1
The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) Commissioner and the Director of the
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (“CFSAN”) have referred to the regulatory
framework as “outdated.” Press Release, U.S. FDA, FDA Statement: Statement from FDA
Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., and Susan Mayne, Ph.D., Director of the Center for Food
Safety and Applied Nutrition, on Tests Confirming a 2017 Finding of Asbestos Contamination
in Certain Cosmetic Products and New Steps that FDA Is Pursuing to Improve Cosmetics
Safety (Mar. 5, 2019) [hereinafter Statement from FDA Commissioner],
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scottgottlieb-md-and-susan-mayne-phd-director-center-food-safety-and [https://perma.cc/76C4NEZY]. Unlike foods, drugs, devices, biologics, veterinary products, and tobacco—which
each have their own center at FDA—cosmetics are regulated by CFSAN. See Center for Food
Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), U.S. FDA (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/office-foods-and-veterinary-medicine/center-food-safetyand-applied-nutrition-cfsan [https://perma.cc/93VR-HQHE].
2
Compare Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, §§ 601604, 52 Stat. 1040, 1054-55 (1938) (originally codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 361-364 (Supp. 4
1938)), with 21 U.S.C. §§ 361-363 (2018). In 1997, the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act (“FDAMA”) added section 752, Preemption for Labeling or Packaging of
Cosmetics, to the FDCA. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-115, sec. 412, § 752, 111 Stat. 2296, 2376 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 379s); see also
infra Section I.E.2.
3
See, e.g., FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.);
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929,
72 Stat. 1784 (1958) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
4
For example, on March 5, 2019, FDA warned consumers not to use certain cosmetics
from Claire’s after FDA announced that samples of three products tested positive for asbestos.
FDA Advises Consumers to Stop Using Certain Cosmetic Products, U.S. FDA (Aug. 24,
2020) [hereinafter FDA Advises Consumers], https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmeticsrecalls-alerts/fda-advises-consumers-stop-using-certain-cosmetic-products
[https://perma.cc/8M7Z-BH4N]. In its alert, FDA noted that asbestos “is a known carcinogen”
whose “health risks are well-documented.” Id. The FDA Commissioner and the Director of
CFSAN in a joint statement stated that “FDA requested that Claire’s recall the products
because they should not be used by consumers,” but that “Claire’s . . . refused to comply with
the FDA’s request, and the agency does not have authority to mandate a recall.” Statement
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is weaker than its authority with respect to the other major product categories.5
As a result, FDA cannot use many of the tools that it uses to regulate those other
products to regulate cosmetics.6 For example, in contrast to—at least some—
foods, drugs, and devices, there is no requirement that cosmetic establishments
register with FDA;7 FDA is generally unable to inspect cosmetic records,
including those related to safety;8 Good Manufacturing Practice (“GMP”) for
from FDA Commissioner, supra note 1. Less than a week later, the company announced a
voluntary recall of the products. Claire’s Stores, Inc., Announces Voluntary Recall of Three
Make-Up Products, U.S. FDA (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-marketwithdrawals-safety-alerts/claires-stores-inc-announces-voluntary-recall-three-make-products
[https://perma.cc/FTG5-BDFM].
As another example, as of November 15, 2016, FDA had received 1,386 consumer reports
about adverse reactions reported to be associated with WEN by Chaz Dean Cleansing
Conditioners. FDA Information for Consumers About WEN by Chaz Dean Cleansing
Conditioners, U.S. FDA (Nov. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Information for Consumers About WEN],
https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20171104085255/https://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics
/ProductsIngredients/Products/ucm511631.htm. In addition, “[w]hen the FDA inspected the
manufacturing and distribution facilities for these products, [it] learned that consumers had
reported reactions in more than 21,000 complaints submitted to . . . the companies that market
and manufacture the products.” Id. Under current law, however, FDA does not have the
authority to generally inspect cosmetic records, and companies are not required to report
adverse events to FDA. FDCA § 704, 21 U.S.C. § 374; see also Information for Consumers
About WEN, supra.
5
See, e.g., Jordan Paradise & Ethan Fitzpatrick, Synthetic Biology: Does Re-Writing
Nature Require Re-Writing Regulation?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 53, 70 (2012) (“Cosmetics are
the least regulated product category that the FDA oversees.”).
6
See Marie Boyd, Gender, Race & the Inadequate Regulation of Cosmetics, 30 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 275, 301-06 (2018).
7
See id. at 302. Compare FDCA § 510, 21 U.S.C. § 360 (requiring drug establishments to
be registered with FDA), id. § 415, 21 U.S.C. § 350d (requiring food facilities to be registered
with FDA), id. § 905, 21 U.S.C. § 387e (requiring tobacco establishments to register with
FDA), 21 C.F.R. § 807.20 (2021) (requiring covered device establishments to be registered
with FDA), id. ch. 1, subch. A, subpt. H (requiring food facilities to be registered with FDA),
and id. pt. 207 (requiring “foreign and domestic establishment registration for human drugs,
including drugs that are regulated under a biologics license application, and animal drugs”),
with id. pt. 710 (detailing the “voluntary registration of cosmetic product establishments” with
FDA), and Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program, U.S. FDA (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/registrationprogram/default.htm
[https://perma.cc/8QRDUUQ2] (stating that “[b]ecause product filings and establishment registrations are not
mandatory, voluntary submissions provide FDA with the best estimate of information
available about cosmetic products and ingredients . . . and businesses engaged in their
manufacture and distribution”).
8
See FDCA § 704, 21 U.S.C. § 374; id. § 414(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 350c(a)(l); see also U.S.
FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FDA RECORDS ACCESS AUTHORITY UNDER SECTIONS 414
AND 704 OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT (2014) [hereinafter FDA RECORDS
ACCESS AUTHORITY], https://www.fda.gov/media/83083/download [https://perma.cc/942S2ZLJ]; Statement from FDA Commissioner, supra note 1 (listing “access to records
(including consumer complaints)” as a tool that “a more modern approach” to cosmetics
regulation “could include”).
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cosmetics is set forth in non-binding draft guidance and guidelines;9
manufacturers are not required to report adverse events for cosmetics;10 and
cosmetics have no premarket approval requirements.11 In addition, unlike for
some establishments, the law does not establish the frequency of inspections of
cosmetic establishments.12 And FDA has no mandatory recall authority for
cosmetics.13
In recent years, several unsuccessful bills have been introduced in Congress
that would reform cosmetic regulation.14 The federal preemption of state law has
emerged as a key issue in cosmetic reform, and cosmetics are poised to become

9
Compare 21 C.F.R. pts. 110-111 (providing current Good Manufacturing Practice
(“cGMP”) for food and dietary supplements), and id. pts. 210-211, 225-226 (setting cGMP
for drugs), and id. pt. 820 (establishing cGMP requirements for medical devices), with U.S.
FDA, COSMETIC GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICES: DRAFT GUIDANCE 3 (2013) [hereinafter
GOOD
MANUFACTURING
PRACTICES],
https://www.fda.gov/media/86366/download
[https://perma.cc/L6QF-REQE].
10
Compare FDCA § 761, 21 U.S.C. § 379aa-l (requiring “[s]erious adverse event
reporting for dietary supplements”), id. § 760, 21 U.S.C. § 379aa (requiring “[s]erious adverse
event reporting for nonprescription drugs”), id. § 417, 21 U.S.C. § 350f(d) (reporting for
reportable foods), 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (describing reporting requirements for adverse events
associated with drugs), and id. pt. 803 (describing reporting requirements for medical
devices), with Using Adverse Event Reports to Monitor Cosmetic Safety: A Conversation with
Linda Katz, U.S. FDA (Nov. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Using Adverse Event Reports],
https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/complianceenforcement
/adverseeventreporting/ucm531634.htm [https://perma.cc/3C7K-AA2T] (indicating that
among other limits to FDA oversight, FDA is not able to require “reporting of adverse events
related to cosmetics”).
11
Cf. FDCA § 409, 21 U.S.C. § 348 (setting forth requirements for approval of food
additives); id. § 505(a), 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (requiring premarket approval for new drugs); id.
§§ 513(a)(1)(C), 515, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(C), 360e (requiring premarket approval for
certain medical devices).
12
See FDCA § 421, 21 U.S.C. § 350j; id. § 905(g), 21 U.S.C. § 387e(g); see also id.
§ 510(h)(2)(A), (3), 21 U.S.C. § 360(h)(2)(A), (3) (providing that device and drug
establishments are to be inspected “in accordance with a risk-based schedule” established by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services).
13
See FDA Recall Policy for Cosmetics, U.S. FDA (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-recalls-alerts/fda-recall-policy-cosmetics
[https://perma.cc/9F4J-NPWY] (explaining that the “FDA has no authority . . . to order a
recall of a cosmetic”).
14
These bills include the Cosmetic Safety Enhancement Act of 2019, H.R. 5279, 116th
Cong. (2019); the Safe Cosmetics and Personal Care Products Act of 2019, H.R. 4296, 116th
Cong. (2019); the Personal Care Products Safety Act, S. 726, 116th Cong. (2019); the FDA
Cosmetic Safety and Modernization Act, S. 2003, 115th Cong. (2017); and the Cosmetic
Modernization Amendments of 2017, H.R. 575, 115th Cong. (2017). When this Article was
written, one bill, the Personal Care Products Safety Act of 2021, was pending. S. 2100, 117th
Cong. (2021).
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the latest battleground over preemption in food and drug law.15 Preemption
occurs when federal law displaces state or local law.16 Federal law can preempt
state statutes or state tort law, for example.17 The Personal Care Products
Council (“PCPC”)—“the leading national trade association representing
cosmetics and personal care products companies”18—lists “National Program
Uniformity”—i.e., preemption—as its first principle for federal cosmetic
reform.19 Specifically, the PCPC states that it supports the
[p]reempt[ion of] state and local laws that would duplicate new authorities
in the FDA regulation of cosmetics [and the] preempt[ion of] state and local
laws for all cosmetic ingredients based on human health concerns if the
FDA has reviewed the ingredient’s safety or has been presented with a
safety review of the ingredient by the Expert Panel for Cosmetic Ingredient
Safety and, after a period for the FDA review, has not rejected the Expert
Panel’s safety finding.20
Representative Frank Pallone, the Chair of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, has stated in conjunction with cosmetic reform that preemption

15
See, e.g., Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1672 (2019)
(discussing federal preemption in context of prescription drug warnings); Mut. Pharm. Co. v.
Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 475-76 (2013) (discussing federal preemption in context of design
defect claim); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 232 (2011) (discussing federal
preemption in context of vaccine design defect claims); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581
(2009) (discussing federal preemption in context of failure-to-warn claims); Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321-22 (2008) (determining preemptive effect of the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 34344 (2001) (discussing federal preemption in context of medical devices); Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 474 (1996) (determining preemptive effect of the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 on state negligence claim); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med.
Lab’ys, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 723 (1985) (determining preemptive effect of federal regulation
of plasmapheresis on county ordinances).
Despite the exclusion of cosmetics in its name, food and drug law includes cosmetics. See,
e.g., FDCA §§ 601-603, 21 U.S.C. §§ 361-363; PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL
& LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS chs. 1, 3 & 11 (4th ed.
2014).
16
Preemption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
17
See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, The Welding Fume Case and the Preemptive Effect of
OSHA’s HazCom Standard on Common Law Failure-to-Warn Claims, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 103,
109 (2006).
18
About
PCPC,
PERS.
CARE
PRODS.
COUNCIL,
https://www.personalcarecouncil.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/7S6J-NL5U] (last visited
Jan. 17, 2022).
19
Legislative: PCPC’s Principles for Federal Cosmetics Reform, PERS. CARE PRODS.
COUNCIL,
https://www.personalcarecouncil.org/public-policy/federal-legislative-2021/
[https://perma.cc/7UC5-YBVF] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
20
Id.
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“is a major issue.”21 Whether the preemption of state tort laws specifically
becomes a focus remains to be seen. However, there is some indication that it
may as cosmetic manufacturers have raised preemption as a defense in lawsuits
concerning cosmetic-talc products where plaintiffs have raised state tort law and
other claims, albeit unsuccessfully.22
This Article focuses on the potential impact of the federal preemption of state
tort law on racial and gender equity in the cosmetic context. Specifically, it asks
how the preemption of state tort law—and particularly products liability law—
may “leave out or disadvantage women and members of other excluded
groups.”23 It argues that eliminating state tort law as a potential means of redress
for people injured by cosmetics—people who may disproportionately be women

21
See Energy & Com. Comm., Markup of 13 Health Bills, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY &
COM., at 47:24-47:26 (Mar. 11, 2020) [hereinafter Markup of 13 Health Bills],
https://energycommerce.house.gov/committee-activity/markups/markup-of-13-billssubcommittee-on-health-march-11-2020 [https://perma.cc/SA66-Y35B]; see also Hearing on
“Building Consumer Confidence by Empowering FDA to Improve Cosmetic Safety” Before
the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com. Comm., 116th Cong. 2 (2019)
(statement of Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr., Chairman, Energy & Com. Comm.),
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/docum
ents/2019.12.4.PALLONE.%20FDA%20Cosmetics%20Leg%20Hearing.HE_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/REA6-JMCE] (“I also understand that my colleagues and industry
stakeholders still would like to see preemption language added to th[e Cosmetic Safety
Enhancement Act bill]”); Ryan Nelson, Cosmetic Safety Enhancement Act Advances in US
House, Still Without Preemption, HBW INSIGHT (Mar. 12, 2020) [hereinafter Cosmetic Safety
Enhancement Act Advances in US House], https://hbw.pharmaintelligence.informa.com
/RS149785/Cosmetic-Safety-Enhancement-Act-Advances-In-US-House-Still-WithoutPreemption [https://perma.cc/LU52-GDU2]; Ryan Nelson, US House Cosmetics Hearing:
Preemption, FDA Ingredient Review Could Be Regulatory Reform Snags, HBW INSIGHT
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://hbw.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/RS149491/US-HouseCosmetics-Hearing-Preemption-FDA-Ingredient-Review-Could-Be-Regulatory-ReformSnags [https://perma.cc/96XL-HXUT].
22
See Feinberg v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 50515(U), slip op. at 11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar.
22, 2012) (rejecting defendant’s express and implied preemption arguments); Order Denying
Defendants’ Post Trial Motions, Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1522-cc-10417, 2018
WL 7960293 (Mo. Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 19, 2018) (“This Court has previously considered
Defendants’ preemption argument on this issue and found that Plaintiffs’ claims were not
preempted.”); Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.’s
Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict at 36, Ingham, No. 1522-cc-10417, 2018 WL 7079682 (Mo. Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 20,
2018) (arguing that “Defendants are . . . entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict as
to plaintiffs’ claims for failure to warn because they are preempted”); see also Johnson &
Johnson v. Fitch, 2019-IA-00033-SCT (¶ 29), 315 So. 3d 1017, 1025 (Miss. 2021) (holding
that “State’s claim is not barred by the principles of express or implied preemption” in a case
brought by the Mississippi Attorney General under the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act);
infra Section I.E.1.
23
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831 (1990); see
also Boyd, supra note 6, at 284-85 (asking an expanded version of the “woman question”
about cosmetic law and regulation).
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and members of other excluded groups—may make cosmetics less safe and
exacerbate existing inequities.
Much is potentially at stake. A couple of examples illustrate the types of cases
that preemption could impact and the potential scope of such cases. Johnson &
Johnson indicated in a Security and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filing that
as of January 3, 2021, it was facing approximately 25,000 plaintiffs alleging
direct claims in pending lawsuits regarding body powders—i.e., cosmetics—
containing talc.24 In one such lawsuit, Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson,25 the
plaintiffs obtained a $4.69 billion jury verdict, which a court later reduced to
$2.2 billion.26 The case involved women who claimed that the company’s
products caused their ovarian cancer.27 The plaintiffs alleged “claims for strict
liability, negligence, and other torts.”28 As another example, WEN by Chaz
Dean, Inc. and Guthy-Renker, LLC settled—without admitting any
wrongdoing—a class-action lawsuit that included state tort law claims for a little
over $26 million.29 The plaintiffs alleged that the cosmetics—hair care

24
Johnson & Johnson, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 84-88 (Feb. 22, 2021). While the
ultimate resolution of the talc cases remained to be seen, at the time that this Article was
written, the company’s most recent 10-K indicated that in the cases that have gone to trial,
“the Company . . . obtained defense verdicts in a number of them, but there have also been
verdicts against the Company, many of which have been reversed on appeal.” Id. at 86. The
company’s 10-K also indicates that “in certain circumstances the Company has . . . settle[d]
cases.” Id. In its 2020 annual report, Colgate-Palmolive Company indicated that as of
December 31, 2020, there were 137 individual cases pending against it, “alleging that certain
talcum products that were sold prior to 1996 were contaminated with asbestos.” ColgatePalmolive Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 118 (Feb. 18, 2021).
25
608 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2716 (2021).
26
Id. at 680, 724; J&J Loses Appeal of $2.2 Billion Talc Verdict, WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
2020, at A11 (reporting that the Missouri Supreme Court “refused to consider Johnson &
Johnson’s appeal of a $2.12 billion damages award to women who” filed suit claiming J&J’s
baby powder and other talc products caused the women’s ovarian cancer); Amanda Bronstad,
As Mo. Supreme Court Lets Talc Verdict Stand, J&J Plans to Petition for SCOTUS to Review
$2.1B Award, LAW.COM (Nov. 3, 2020, 5:07 PM), https://www.law.com/2020/11/03/as-mosupreme-court-lets-2-1b-talc-verdict-stand-jj-plans-to-petition-for-scotus-review-2-1b-talcverdict/?slreturn=20210329115532.
27
Ingham, 608 S.W.3d at 678.
28
Id.
29
Order Granting Stipulation to File a Third Amended Complaint (152) and Granting
Motion for Class Certification and Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement (153) at 1, 4-5,
18, Friedman v. Guthy-Renker, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-06009, 2016 WL 11756891 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
28, 2016) [hereinafter Order Granting Stipulation to File a Third Amended Complaint], ECF
No. 178; see also Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement and Final Judgment at 2,
Friedman v. Guthy-Renker, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-06009, 2017 WL 11646935 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
21, 2017), ECF No. 251; Julie A. Steinberg, $26M Chaz Wen Hair Product Deal Tentatively
Approved, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 1, 2016, 1:08 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com
/bloomberglawnews/class-action/XFLMN1BO000000?bna_news_filter=class-action#jcite.
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products—caused hair loss and scalp irritation.30 If cosmetic tort law claims
were preempted, plaintiffs would be unable to maintain such claims.
The question of whether federal law should preempt state tort law—and if so
to what extent—has important equity implications as the risks that the failures
in the regulation of cosmetics engender may disproportionately fall on women,
particularly those who are members of other historically excluded groups.31
Cosmetic use and exposure may vary by gender, race, and socioeconomic status.
For example, surveys have found that women, on average, use more cosmetics
than men.32 Moreover, women are more likely than men to be employed in jobs
that frequently involve exposure to cosmetics.33
30

See Order Granting Stipulation to File a Third Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at

2.
31
Boyd, supra note 6, at 289 (“[B]ecause cosmetics are a highly gendered product and
industry, failures in cosmetics law and regulation may disproportionately jeopardize the
health of women, particularly women who are members of other excluded groups.”). Others
have noted that the effects of preemption may disproportionately impact certain demographic
groups, including women in other contexts. See, e.g., Eric Lindenfeld, The Unintended
Pregnancy Crisis: A No-Fault Fix, 17 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 285, 306
(2016) (discussing preemption in context of contraceptive products and noting that
“women . . . are now at an even greater risk of being barred from any form of compensation”);
Courtney A. Markey, Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing:
Why Generic and Brand-Name Pharmaceuticals Must Be Treated Equally Under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 15 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 135, 159 (2013) (discussing the
U.S. Supreme Court’s preemption holding in PLIVA v. Mensing [564 U.S. 604 (2011)] and
arguing that “women, minorities, and the elderly” are “disproportionately harmed by [that]
decision”); see also Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender
Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 46-55 (1995) (discussing efforts to “bar punitive
damages in any case where a drug or medical device has received pre-market approval from
FDA” and how this “FDA Defense” may impact the ability “for women to find redress for
mass product liability injuries”).
32
See, e.g., Discussion Draft of the Food and Drug Administration Globalization Act
Legislation: Device and Cosmetic Safety Provisions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health
of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 110th Cong. 134, 141 (2008) (statement of Jane
Houlihan, Vice-President for Research, Environmental Working Group); Exposures Add Up
– Survey Results, ENV’T WORKING GRP. (2004) (archived at https://perma.cc/VGC4-BZBX
on Nov. 3, 2018); Survey, YOUGOV (Sept. 11, 2013), https://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus
_uploads/document/ypg8eyjbsv/tabs_skincare_0910112013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UR2NZRFA]. Men’s attitudes, however, towards certain cosmetics may be changing. See, e.g.,
Joanna Piacenza, As Beauty Norms Blur, One-Third of Young Men Say They’d Consider
Wearing Cosmetics, MORNING CONSULT (Oct. 28, 2019, 12:01 AM),
https://morningconsult.com/2019/10/28/as-beauty-norms-blur-one-third-of-young-men-saytheyd-consider-wearing-cosmetics/ [https://perma.cc/LLM6-3679] (stating that 33% of men
ages eighteen to twenty-nine and 30% of men ages thirty to forty-four said “they would
consider wearing makeup”).
33
For example, in 2020, 93.9% of skincare specialists; 90.8% of hairdressers, hairstylists,
and cosmetologists; and 79.3% of manicurists and pedicurists were women. Labor Force
Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. tbl.11 (Jan. 22,
2021) [hereinafter Labor Force Statistics], https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.htm
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Studies have also found racial and ethnic differences in the purchase and use
of certain cosmetics as well as “[t]argeted racial/ethnic marketing.”34 These
differences may lead to differences in potentially harmful chemical exposure,
which may disproportionately impact “vulnerable and underserved women.”35
For example, “[c]ompared with white women, women of color have higher
levels of beauty product–related environmental chemicals in their bodies,”
which may have negative health repercussions.36
State tort law can help fill gaps in the federal regulation of cosmetics—
including the gaps that would likely remain under the recent reform proposals.37

[https://perma.cc/8JD3-LHRG]. These statistics, however, do not mean that men do not use
cosmetics. They do. In fact, the men’s personal care industry is growing. See, e.g., Nia
Warfield, Men Are a Multibillion Dollar Growth Opportunity for the Beauty Industry, CNBC
(May 20, 2019, 3:20 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/17/men-are-a-multibillion-dollargrowth-opportunity-for-the-beauty-industry.html [https://perma.cc/VJV2-PQNX].
34
See Ami R. Zota & Bhavna Shamasunder, The Environmental Injustice of Beauty:
Framing Chemical Exposures from Beauty Products as a Health Disparities Concern, 217
AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 418, 419 (2017) (discussing “disproportionate beauty
product exposures among vulnerable populations” and citing various studies).
35
Zota & Shamasunder, supra note 34, at 418.e1, 419 tbl.; Jessica S. Helm, Marcia
Nishioka, Julia Green Brody, Ruthann A. Rudel & Robin E. Dodson, Measurement of
Endocrine Disrupting and Asthma-Associated Chemicals in Hair Products Used by Black
Women, 165 ENV’T RSCH. 448, 455 (2018) (“[A] wide range of endocrine disrupting and
asthma-associated compounds [are] in hair products used by Black women, including
products marketed towards children.”); Big Market for Black Cosmetics, but Less Hazardous
Choices Limited, ENV’T WORKING GRP. (Dec. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Big Market for Black
Cosmetics],
https://www.ewg.org/research/big-market-black-cosmetics-less-hazardouschoices-limited [https://perma.cc/48KX-F7QW] (stating that “[a] smaller share of hair and
beauty products marketed to Black women scored low in potentially harmful ingredients than
products aimed at the general public” and that this “could mean they are being exposed to
more potentially hazardous chemicals”); see also Patrick Celestine, Righting the Imbalance
in Toxic Cosmetics, TRIAL, May 2020, at 52, 52 (arguing that “[l]egislation to regulate
cosmetics and ban asbestos is needed to protect everyone who uses contaminated products,
especially women of color, who are disproportionately affected by toxic cosmetics”).
36
Zota & Shamasunder, supra note 34, at 418.e1; see also AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS
& GYNECOLOGISTS, NO. 832, REDUCING PRENATAL EXPOSURE TO TOXIC ENVIRONMENTAL
AGENTS, in 138 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY e40, e47, e50 (2021), https://www.acog.org//media/project/acog/acogorg/clinical/files/committee-opinion/articles/2021/07/reducingprenatal-exposure-to-toxic-environmental-agents.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C34A-CXHL]
(discussing personal care products as a potential source of toxins); id. at e41 (stating that
“effects of exposure to environmental chemicals can be exacerbated by injustice, poverty,
neighborhood quality, housing quality, psychosocial stress, and nutritional status”); AM.
COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, NO. 575, COMPANION PIECE TO 575: EXPOSURE
TO TOXIC ENVIRONMENTAL AGENTS (2013) (withdrawn) (archived at https://perma.cc/4Z47PEMN on May 12, 2021) (“Although exposure to toxic environmental chemicals is universal,
harmful environmental exposure is inequitably and unequally distributed, which leaves some
populations, including underserved women, more vulnerable to adverse reproductive health
effects than other populations.”).
37
See infra Section I.D.
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Despite its limitations,38 state tort law can help to complement and strengthen
the regulatory system, which confers no private right of action on consumers
injured by cosmetics.39 State tort law can provide recognition, redress, and
compensation to consumers injured by cosmetics,40 serve a deterrent function,
encouraging manufacturers to take due care,41 and reveal important information
about product risks and safety.42 Preempting cosmetic claims would eliminate
these potential benefits.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I defines cosmetics and provides an
overview of the existing regulatory framework for cosmetics and its substantial
limitations. It considers some of the potential risks of cosmetics and why they
may disproportionately impact women, particularly women who are members
of other historically excluded groups. It also considers the federal preemption of
state tort law claims under current law. Part II argues that the federal preemption
of cosmetic claims based on state tort law would be detrimental to consumer
health and safety and would put consumers in an even worse position than they
currently are. However, even if Congress enacts cosmetic reforms, preserving
state tort law claims would be important for consumer health and safety. Part II
also argues that the federal preemption of cosmetic claims based on state tort
law would have a disparate impact on women, particularly women who are
members of other excluded groups—groups for whom tort law may offer
especially significant, yet flawed, benefits in light of other disparities, such as
those in healthcare. Part III then builds on Part II by undertaking an examination
of recent litigation involving cosmetic-talc products. This examination
highlights the importance of state tort lawsuits in advancing gender and racial
equity in the cosmetic context. While this Article focuses on why Congress
should expressly preserve state tort law claims and why both state tort law and
federal regulation are needed in the cosmetic context, this analysis has
implications for the broader debate over the preemption of state tort law claims.

38
For a discussion of the limitations of tort law, including how it may perpetuate existing
gender and inequalities, see infra Section II.C.2.
39
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 310, 21 U.S.C. § 337 (limiting
proceedings to be brought by the United States, and in some instances, the states); see also
James M. Beck & John A. Valentine, Challenging the Viability of FDCA-Based Causes of
Action in the Tort Context: The Orthopedic Bone Screw Experience, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
389, 402 (2000) (discussing the preclusion of private rights of action for FDCA violations).
40
See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Poking Holes in the Fabric of Tort: A Comment, 56 DEPAUL
L. REV. 293, 301 (2007) (discussing “the costs” of regulatory preemption and stating that
“[m]ost obviously, victims are left without compensation when the defendant’s conduct
conforms to regulatory standards but causes injury nonetheless”); see also 74 AM. JUR. 2D
Torts § 2, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2021) (“[A] principal function of tort law is to
compensate a victim for wrongdoing or unreasonable conduct of the tortfeasor.”).
41
See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS
§ 2.5, at 23-24 (2d ed. 2016); Rabin, supra note 40, at 301.
42
See infra Section II.B.4.
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COSMETIC SAFETY, FEDERAL REGULATION & PREEMPTION

Definition

This Article focuses on products that are solely “cosmetics.”43 “Cosmetics”
are “articles intended to be rubbed, poured, sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced
into, or otherwise applied to the human body or any part thereof for cleansing,
beautifying, promoting attractiveness, or altering the appearance” or “articles
intended for use as a component of any such articles.”44 Cosmetics include
makeup (e.g., “lipstick, blush, foundation, face powder, eye shadow[,] eye liner,
and mascara”),45 hair products (e.g., “[d]yes, relaxers, [and] removers”),46 nail
products, tattoos and permanent makeup, some cleansing products, and some
lotions.47
This Article excludes from consideration products that meet the definition of
cosmetics and the definition of another FDA-regulated product category.
Accordingly, this Article does not address products such as breast implants,
Latisse, and Botox Cosmetic. FDA regulates these products not as cosmetics but
as devices, drugs, and biologics, which are subject to more stringent regulation.48
In addition, “color additives” are excluded from consideration here. Although
“color additives” are often used in or as cosmetics, they are a distinct regulatory

43

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 201(i), 21 U.S.C. § 321(i) (defining
“cosmetic”).
44
Id. The definition of “cosmetic” excludes “soap,” which is defined narrowly based on
its composition, the ingredients responsible for its cleaning action, and its intended use. See
21 C.F.R. § 701.20 (2021) (defining soap).
45
Makeup, U.S. FDA (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmeticproducts/makeup [https://perma.cc/A9BA-CJPG].
46
Cosmetic
Products,
U.S.
FDA
(Aug.
24,
2020),
https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetic-products-ingredients/cosmetic-products
[https://perma.cc/NBH4-A9EF].
47
Id.;
Soaps
&
Lotions,
U.S.
FDA
(Aug.
24,
2020),
https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetic-products/soaps-lotions
[https://perma.cc/86C6MHYP] (“Lotions . . . and other cleansers may be regulated as cosmetics or as other product
categories, depending on how they are intended to be used.”).
48
See U.S. FDA, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch., NDA 22-369, Approval Letter for
Latisse (Dec. 24, 2008), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2008
/022369s000_Approv.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL9R-VG57] (approving Latisse for the
“treatment of hypotrichosis of the eyelashes by increasing their growth including length,
thickness and darkness”); U.S. FDA, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch., STN BL
103000/5000, Approval Letter for Botox Cosmetic (Apr. 12, 2002),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2002/botuall041202L.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZQ2L-6NR5] (approving a biologic license supplement for Botulinum
Toxin Type A for the “treatment of glabellar lines”); Breast Implants, U.S. FDA (Oct. 27,
2021),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/implants-and-prosthetics/breast-implants
[https://perma.cc/EP3Q-MNFX] (noting that breast implants are medical devices and that
FDA has approved two types of breast implants for sale in the United States).
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category subject to their own regulatory requirements.49 The FDCA defines a
“color additive,” in part, as a substance that “when added or applied to a food,
drug, or cosmetic, or to the human body or any part thereof, is capable . . . of
imparting color thereto.”50 Unlike cosmetics, FDA must approve (i.e., “list”)
color additives before use.51 In addition, FDA may approve color additives for
use in products other than cosmetics.52
B.

Industry Overview

Cosmetics are big business. According to IBISWorld, the total revenue for
cosmetic and beauty products manufacturing in the United States in 2019 was
estimated to be $52.3 billion.53 While the exact number of cosmetic
manufacturers in the United States is unknown because they are not required to
register with FDA,54 IBISWorld estimated that 4,046 cosmetic and beauty
products manufacturing enterprises were in the United States in 2019.55
Similarly, the number of foreign companies that manufacture cosmetics for or
export to the United States is unknown due to the lack of required reporting.56
However, in 2017, FDA estimated that there were 29,000 such companies.57

49
See FDCA § 201(t)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(t)(1); Color Additives Permitted for Use in
Cosmetics, U.S. FDA (Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetic-ingredientnames/color-additives-permitted-use-cosmetics [https://perma.cc/WEC3-DK3L].
50
FDCA § 201(t)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 321(t)(1)(B).
51
Id. § 721(a), (b)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 379e(a), (b)(1); id. § 402(c), 21 U.S.C. § 342(c); id.
§ 601(e), 21 U.S.C. § 361(e).
52
Id. § 721, 21 U.S.C. § 379e (setting forth requirements for “[l]isting and certification of
color additives for foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics”). The literature uses a number of
terms (e.g., “personal care products”) that may include cosmetics but may also include
products in another FDA-regulated categories (e.g., drugs or devices) or outside of FDA’s
authority (e.g., consumer products).
53
JACQUELINE HINER, IBISWORLD, INC., COSMETIC & BEAUTY PRODUCTS
MANUFACTURING IN THE UNITED STATES, INDUSTRY AT A GLANCE 4 (2019).
54
See Voluntary Registration of Cosmetic Product Establishments, 21 C.F.R. pt. 710
(2021).
55
HINER, supra note 53, at 4.
56
Letter from Anna K. Abram, Deputy Comm’r for Pol’y, Plan., Legis. & Analysis, U.S.
FDA, to Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr., Ranking Member, Energy & Com. Comm., House of
Representatives 2 (June 30, 2017), https://democrats-energycommerce.house.gov/sites
/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/FDA%20Response%20to%20Rep.
%20Pallone%20on%20Cosmetic%20Imports.pdf [https://perma.cc/MGP2-PRZM].
57
Id.

180

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:167

Although the industry has grown substantially since 1938 when the FDCA was
enacted,58 cosmetic law has largely remained unchanged.59
C.

Why Federal Cosmetic Reform Is Needed
1.

Federal Cosmetic Law & Regulation
a.

Overview

The FDCA establishes the basic regulatory framework for cosmetics.60 While
there have been a few amendments to the cosmetic provisions since 1938, the
basic regulatory structure based on post-market regulation has not changed61:
The FDCA prohibits the adulteration and misbranding of cosmetics.62 In
contrast, Congress has amended, and generally expanded, FDA’s powers
concerning food, drugs, and medical devices—the original major product
categories in the 1938 Act.63
58
See HINER, supra note 53 (estimating the 2019 revenue and profit for the cosmetics and
beauty products manufacturing industry); GILBERT VAIL, A HISTORY OF COSMETICS IN
AMERICA 137 (1947) (identifying the value of the cosmetic industry production in 1937 as
$132,336,481 and in 1939 as $147,465,585); see also CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU
OF LAB. STATS., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (indicating
that the value of $1 at end of 1938 has same buying power as $18.68 in January 2021).
59
Statement from FDA Commissioner, supra note 1 (“Our program for cosmetics also has
remained small despite the industry’s significant expansion and global supply chain.”).
60
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) §§ 201(i), 301, 601-603, 752, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 321(i), 331, 361-363, 379s. This Article does not address other laws that set forth
requirements for cosmetics such as the Federal Trade Commission Act. See, e.g., Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58.
61
Color additives, which must be approved before use, are the exception to this stagnation.
See sources cited supra note 51. Congress has made amendments to address color additives,
the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, and plastic microbeads. See generally Color Additive
Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-618, sec. 102(c)(1), (2), §§ 601(e), 602(e), 74 Stat. 397,
398 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 361(e), 362(e)); id. sec. 103(a)(3), repealing § 604
(repealing 21 U.S.C. § 364); Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-601,
sec. 7(f), § 602, 84 Stat. 1670, 1673 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 362(f)); Microbead
Free Waters Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-114, sec. 2, § 301, 129 Stat. 3129, 3129 (codified
at 21 U.S.C. § 331(ddd)) (prohibiting “manufacture or the introduction or delivery for
introduction into interstate commerce of a rinse-off cosmetic that contains intentionally-added
plastic microbeads”). In addition, Congress has added the preemption and savings provisions
in section 752 of the FDCA (21 U.S.C. § 379s), which are discussed in Section I.E.2. The
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, sec. 412,
§ 752, 111 Stat. 2296, 2373, 2376 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 379s).
62
FDCA §§ 301, 601-602, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 361-362.
63
See, e.g., FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885
(2011); Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539; Drug
Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780; see also Robert M. Califf, Jonathan
McCall & Daniel B. Mark, Editorial, Cosmetics, Regulations, and the Public Health:
Understanding the Safety of Medical and Other Products, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1080,
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In addition, FDA’s cosmetic regulations are limited.64 The regulations include
various labeling requirements,65 and provide that the use of eleven specified
ingredients or ingredient-types in cosmetics is subject to restrictions or renders
cosmetics adulterated.66
b.

Limitations

The limitations of current cosmetic laws and regulations are welldocumented,67 and therefore only briefly summarized here. First, there is no premarket approval requirement for cosmetics.68 This stands in contrast to drugs,
certain devices, and food additives, which Congress has specified require
premarket approval.69 While the cosmetic industry has created and funded a
Cosmetic Ingredient Review (“CIR”), which reviews the safety of cosmetic
ingredients,70 the CIR suffers from several significant limitations.71 For
example, compliance with CIR recommendations is voluntary, as the program’s
findings do not bind the industry.72 In addition, the CIR has only reviewed a
fraction of the ingredients used in cosmetics, cosmetic safety information is
often limited, and the CIR “generally focuses on the ingredients’ potential to

1080 (2017) (“Although FDA oversight of drugs and medical devices has been substantially
strengthened by later legislation, the lack of similar enhancements for cosmetics means that
the cosmetic industry remains largely self-regulated.”). Compare FDCA, Pub. L. No. 75-717,
52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (originally codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (Supp. 4 1938)), with 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-399i (2018).
64
See 21 C.F.R. pts. 700-740 (2021).
65
See id. pt. 701 (establishing requirements for cosmetic labeling); id. pt. 740 (establishing
requirements for cosmetic product warning statements).
66
See id. pt. 700; id. § 250.250.
67
See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 6, at 323 n.363 (listing scholars and commentators who have
proposed or supported reforms).
68
As noted earlier, color additives require approval. See FDCA § 721, 21 U.S.C. § 379e;
id. § 402(c), 21 U.S.C. § 342(c); id. § 601(e), 21 U.S.C. § 361(e).
69
Id. § 409, 21 U.S.C. § 348 (requiring premarket approval of food additives); id. § 505,
21 U.S.C. § 355 (requiring premarket approval of new drugs); id. §§ 513(a)(1)(C), 515, 21
U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(C), 360e (requiring premarket approval of class III devices).
70
About the Cosmetic Ingredient Review, COSM. INGREDIENT REV., https://www.cirsafety.org/about [https://perma.cc/22R5-B862] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022); How Does CIR
Work?,
COSM. INGREDIENT REV.,
https://www.cir-safety.org/how-does-cir-work
[https://perma.cc/CNN9-W9KD] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
71
See, e.g., Rajiv Shah & Kelly E. Taylor, Concealing Danger: How the Regulation of
Cosmetics in the United States Puts Consumers at Risk, 23 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 203, 204
(2011); Valerie J. Watnick, The Missing Link: U.S. Regulation of Consumer Cosmetic
Products to Protect Human Health and the Environment, 31 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 594, 60506 (2014) (“[E]xperts have estimated that only between 11% and 13% of ingredients used in
cosmetics have actually been subject to CIR analysis.”).
72
See Jacqueline A. Greff, Regulation of Cosmetics That Are Also Drugs, 51 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 243, 246 (1996).

182

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:167

cause short-term dermatological reactions . . . not their potential to cause longterm health problems.”73
With no premarket approval authority for cosmetics, FDA relies on
postmarket compliance and enforcement activities to regulate cosmetics. These,
however, are also limited. For example, as noted above, the number of cosmetic
establishments is unknown because establishment registration is voluntary,
unlike for drug, device, tobacco product, and food facilities.74 This complicates
regulation because FDA may not even know that a firm is manufacturing
cosmetics. FDA inspections of cosmetic establishments are infrequent.75 Unlike
for some other major product categories, the FDCA does not specify the
frequency of inspections for cosmetic establishments.76 Furthermore, in the
unlikely event that FDA inspects a cosmetic establishment, FDA’s authority,
unlike that for other product categories, does not generally include the inspection
of records.77 Moreover, its GMPs for cosmetics are simply draft guidance.78
Cosmetics also differ from the other major product categories because their
producers are not subject to mandatory adverse event reporting in any
circumstance.79 Unlike drugs, cosmetics are not subject to mandatory ingredient

73
Shah & Taylor, supra note 71, at 204; see Ivan J. Boyer, Wilma F. Bergfeld, Bart
Heldreth, Monice M. Fiume & Lillian J. Gill, The Cosmetic Ingredient Review Program—
Expert Safety Assessments of Cosmetic Ingredients in an Open Forum, 36 INT’L J.
TOXICOLOGY (SUPPLEMENT 2) 5S, 7S-10S (2017).
74
See FDCA § 510, 21 U.S.C. § 360; id. § 415, 21 U.S.C. § 350d; id. § 905, 21 U.S.C.
§ 387e; 21 C.F.R. § 207.17 (2021); id. ch. 1, subch. H; id. pt. 807 (2020); Voluntary Cosmetic
Registration Program, supra note 7.
75
In fiscal year 2018, FDA conducted seventy-one domestic cosmetic establishment
inspections and six foreign inspections. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2020:
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 71 (2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/121408/download [https://perma.cc/ZMC4-UM6F].
76
See FDCA § 421, 21 U.S.C. § 350j; id. § 905(g), 21 U.S.C. § 387e(g). The FDCA
provides that device and drug establishments are to be inspected “in accordance with a riskbased schedule” established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Id.
§ 510(h)(2)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 360(h)(2)(A).
77
Id. § 703, 21 U.S.C. § 373; id. § 704, 21 U.S.C. § 374; id. § 414(a)(1), 21 U.S.C.
§ 350c(a)(1); 21 C.F.R. pts. 110-11; id. pts. 210-11, 225-26; id. § 700.27(c); id. pt. 820; GOOD
MANUFACTURING PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 3-4; Statement from FDA Commissioner, supra
note 1; see also FDA RECORDS ACCESS AUTHORITY, supra note 8, at 3-4.
78
GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 1.
79
FDCA § 761, 21 U.S.C. § 379aa-l (mandating reporting for adverse events associated
with dietary supplements); id. § 760, 21 U.S.C. § 379aa (mandating reporting for adverse
events associated with nonprescription drugs); id. § 417, 21 U.S.C. § 350f (mandating
reporting for reportable foods); 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (mandating “reporting of adverse drug
experiences”); id. pt. 803 (mandating adverse event reporting for medical devices); Using
Adverse Event Reports, supra note 10; see also Mandatory Reporting Requirements:
Manufacturers, Importers and Device User Facilities, U.S. FDA (May 5, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/postmarket-requirements-devices/mandatoryreporting-requirements-manufacturers-importers-and-device-user-facilities
[https://perma.cc/D8E5-RGBV].
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listing.80 Cosmetics for professional use only, unlike drugs and many foods, are
also not required to have ingredient labeling.81 In addition, “FDA has no
authority under the [FDCA] to order a recall of a cosmetic,” and instead must
rely on a request, which the company may or may not heed.82 Moreover, in court
actions, the government bears the burden of proving that the cosmetic violates
the FDCA.83
In addition, FDA’s budget for cosmetics is limited and insufficient to regulate
cosmetics adequately. In an editorial, former FDA Commissioner Robert M.
Califf, Jonathan McCall, and Daniel B. Mark, wrote that in comparison to the
global cosmetic industry, FDA’s Office of Cosmetics and Colors “is
tiny . . . and, with a budget of around $13 million for Fiscal Year 2017,
chronically underfunded, even considering its limited responsibilities and scope
of authority.”84 The limitations of the current regulatory system are concerning
because they may put the health and safety of those who use or are exposed to
cosmetics at risk.

80

FDCA § 510(j), 21 U.S.C. § 360(j); 21 C.F.R. § 207.49.
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 89-755, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461); FDCA § 403(i), (q), 21 U.S.C. § 343(i), (q); id.
§ 502(e), 21 U.S.C. § 352(e); 21 C.F.R. § 701.3.
82
FDA Recall Policy for Cosmetics, supra note 7.
83
FDCA §§ 301, 601, 602, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 361, 362; KATHRYN B. ARMSTRONG &
JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43609, ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOOD, DRUG, AND
COSMETIC ACT: SELECT LEGAL ISSUES 17 (2018) (identifying elements that the government
must prove under the FDCA for criminal convictions); cf. FDCA § 402(f), 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)
(placing burden of proof on the government to establish “that a dietary supplement is
adulterated”); A. Wes Siegner, Jr., The Food & Drug Administration’s Actions on Ephedra
and Androstenedione: Understanding Their Potential Impacts on the Protections of the
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 617, 620 n.18 (2004)
(stating that “courts historically have held that FDA bears the burden of proof in any seizure
actions on the issue of adulteration”).
84
Califf et al., supra note 63, at 1080-81 (arguing that “Congress should provide the
agency with an adequate budget to fulfill its existing responsibilities, which it mandates”);
see also U.S. FDA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: FDA FY 2017 BUDGET—ALL PURPOSE TABLE
(2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/96229/download [https://perma.cc/S6DE-9WZL].
For comparison, the 2017 FDA budget for human drugs was $1.3 billion and for medical
devices was $441 million. HHS FY 2018 Budget in Brief - FDA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. (May 23, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/fy2018/budget-inbrief/fda/index.html#ftno1 [https://perma.cc/2RHT-NKJG]. The budget for foods, which
includes the cosmetics budget as FDA does not have a separate center for cosmetics, was $993
million. Id.; What We Do at CFSAN, U.S. FDA (Sept. 16, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofFoods/CFSAN/WhatWeDo/default
.htm [https://perma.cc/C329-GB3A].
81
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2. Potential Health & Safety Risks
Cosmetics, their ingredients, and their components may pose potential health
hazards and risks.85 This Section highlights a few of the potential issues and
areas of concern. It provides examples of cosmetic products, ingredients, and
potential contaminants that FDA has addressed in warning letters or referenced
in consumer information.
However, it is important to note that there is a dearth of information about the
safety of many cosmetics and cosmetic ingredients, and the long-term safety of
many cosmetic ingredients is unknown.86 Furthermore, even when ingredients
used in cosmetics have been studied and found to cause ill effects, “the
ingredient may not cause the same problems in actual use in a cosmetic” due to
differences in the amount, use, and absorption.87 For example, “[p]arabens are
commonly used as preservatives in cosmetics.”88 The Environmental Working
Group (“EWG”) has noted that “scientific studies suggest that parabens can
disrupt hormones in the body and harm fertility and reproductive organs, affect
birth outcomes, . . . increase the risk of cancer[, and] . . . cause skin irritation.”89
FDA, however, has stated that the agency “do[es] not have information showing
that parabens as they are used in cosmetics have an effect on human health.”90
As another example, FDA has noted that 1,4-dioxane—a byproduct of certain
85

For discussions of potential ingredients of concern and health risks in the legal literature,
see, for example, Anastasia De Paz, The Cosmetic Regime Needs a Makeover: Advocating to
Empower the FDA Through the Safe Cosmetics Act of 2011, 31 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENV’T
L. 337, 340-42 (2012); Katherine Drabiak, Dying to Be Fresh and Clean? Toxicants in
Personal Care Products, the Impact on Cancer Risk, and Epigenetic Damage, 35 PACE ENV’T
L. REV. 75, 83-85 (2017); Rachael Rawlins, Teething on Toxins: In Search of Regulatory
Solutions for Toys and Cosmetics, 20 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2009); Shah & Taylor,
supra note 71, at 208-14; Donald R. Johnson, Note, Not in My Makeup: The Need for
Enhanced Premarket Regulatory Authority over Cosmetics in Light of Increased Usage of
Engineered Nanoparticles, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 82, 82-85 (2009); and Grace
Wallack, Note, Rethinking FDA’s Regulation of Cosmetics, 56 HARV. J. LEGIS. 311, 323-31
(2019).
86
See, e.g., Cosmetics, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (May 28, 2014), https://www.cancer.org
/cancer/cancer-causes/cosmetics.html [https://perma.cc/4FFP-T6QU].
87
Id.
88
Parabens in Cosmetics, U.S. FDA (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.fda.gov
/cosmetics/cosmetic-ingredients/parabens-cosmetics#are_parabens_safe
[https://perma.cc/2EQQ-HD82].
89
Tasha Stoiber, What Are Parabens, and Why Don’t They Belong in Cosmetics?, ENV’T
WOKING GRP. (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.ewg.org/californiacosmetics/parabens
[https://perma.cc/DQY3-FM7V].
90
Parabens in Cosmetics, supra note 88 (emphasis added); see also Molly Wanner &
Neera Nathan, Clean Cosmetics: The Science Behind the Trend, HARV. HEALTH BLOG (Mar.
12, 2019, 2:19 PM), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/clean-cosmetics-the-sciencebehind-the-trend-2019030416066 [https://perma.cc/VCV7-U4Z4] (“Many of the studies
showing a direct relationship between [parabens] and hormonal dysregulation have been
performed in animals rather than in humans, and at higher doses than people would typically
be exposed to through a cosmetic or personal care product.”).
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ingredient manufacturing and a “potential human carcinogen”—may occur in
cosmetics.91 While FDA has stated that it “agree[s] that levels of 1,4-dioxane as
a contaminant in cosmetic products should be reduced to the lowest levels
possible using good manufacturing practices,” it has declined to issue a rule
providing that cosmetics with detectable concentrations of 1,4-dioxane are
adulterated, stating in part, that there is a “lack of data demonstrating that any
detectable concentration of 1,4-dioxane would render a cosmetic injurious to
users under its conditions of use.”92
Cosmetics may contain irritants and allergens. FDA has compiled a list of five
classes “of common allergens found in some cosmetic products.”93 FDA notes
that “[a]llergic reactions can range in severity, but may include hives, itchy skin,
a rash, flaking or peeling skin, facial swelling, irritation of the eyes, nose and
mouth, wheezing, and anaphylaxis.”94 One of the classes of allergens is dyes,
which includes p-phenylenediamine (“PPD”).95 FDA has noted that the use of
black henna is potentially harmful because it often contains a coal-tar hair dye
with PPD, which “can cause dangerous skin reactions in some people.”96 FDA
has written that consumers have reported “injuries to the skin from . . . products
marketed as ‘black henna.’”97
Cosmetics may contain ingredients or nonfunctional constituents, which may
pose other health risks. For example, FDA has issued warning letters to two
companies regarding hair smoothing products it alleged had “methylene glycol,
the liquid form of formaldehyde, which, under the conditions of use prescribed
in the labeling, release[d] formaldehyde.”98 FDA has noted that “[f]ormaldehyde
is a highly reactive chemical that readily reacts with biological tissues,
particularly the mucous tissues lining the respiratory tract and the eyes” and “is
91
See 1,4-Dioxane in Cosmetics: A Manufacturing Byproduct, U.S. FDA (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/potential-contaminants-cosmetics/14-dioxane-cosmeticsmanufacturing-byproduct [https://perma.cc/QT5C-C5L5]; see also Wanner & Nathan, supra
note 90.
92
Letter from Linda M. Katz, Dir., FDA Off. Cosms. & Colors, to Sens. Charles E.
Schumer & Kirsten Gillibrand 1-2 (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document
/FDA-2017-P-2365-0006 [https://perma.cc/XD47-BW5N].
93
Allergens in Cosmetics, U.S. FDA (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics
/cosmetic-ingredients/allergens-cosmetics#common [https://perma.cc/6JRR-FHTB].
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Temporary Tattoos, Henna/Mehndi, and “Black Henna”: Fact Sheet, U.S. FDA (Aug.
24, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetic-products/temporary-tattoos-hennamehnd
i-and-black-henna-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/C5SN-DNY3].
97
Id.
98
U.S. FDA, Ctr. for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition Off. of Compliance, Warning Letter
on Brazilian Blowout (Aug. 22, 2011) (archived at https://web.archive.org
/web/20170327183305/https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/uc
m270809.htm on Mar. 27, 2017); U.S. FDA, Fla. Dist. Off., Warning Letter to Van Tibolli
Beauty Corp. (Sept. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Warning Letter Van Tibolli Beauty Corp.] (archived
at https://perma.cc/AA28-U2NY on Jan. 23, 2020).
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a recognized carcinogen.”99 In 2019, FDA also advised consumers to stop using
certain cosmetic products after it said that samples of the products tested positive
for asbestos, a known carcinogen, during FDA’s survey of talc-containing
cosmetics.100 In addition, through guidance, FDA has sought to educate and
encourage “manufacturers to continue to follow or improve on voluntary good
manufacturing practices that limit trace amount of lead as an impurity” in
cosmetic lip products and externally applied cosmetics.101
Cosmetics may also contain microbial contaminants. For example, FDA
issued several warning letters alleging, among other things, that certain cosmetic
products were “adulterated due to microbial contamination posing a potential
health risk for the uses recommended in the labeling.”102
D.

Federal Cosmetic Reform Bills

The FDA Commissioner and CFSAN Director have stated that “[t]o
significantly shift the safety paradigm of cosmetics in the U.S., [FDA] would
need to work with stakeholders, including Congress, to modernize the outdated
regulatory framework.”103 In recognition of the limitations of the current
framework, legislators have introduced bills during recent Congresses to reform
the regulation of cosmetics. This Section provides a high-level overview of
several bills that would reform the general regulatory framework for cosmetics:
The Personal Care Products Safety Act, Senate Bill 2100; the Cosmetic Safety
Enhancement Act of 2019, House Bill 5279; the Safe Cosmetics and Personal
Care Products Act of 2019, House Bill 4296; the Personal Care Products Safety
Act, Senate Bill 726; the FDA Cosmetic Safety and Modernization Act, Senate
99

Warning Letter Van Tibolli Beauty Corp., supra note 98.
FDA Advises Consumers, supra note 4; Talc, U.S. FDA (Aug. 18, 2020) (website
updated; cited for historical fact and archived at https://perma.cc/W4FV-EQ6A on Jan. 22,
2020).
101
Supporting Document for Recommended Maximum Lead Level in Cosmetic Lip
Products and Externally Applied Cosmetics, U.S. FDA (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-guidance-documents/supporting-documentrecommended-maximum-lead-level-cosmetic-lip-products-and-externally-applied
[https://perma.cc/X6UA-PG5E] (emphasis added). Exposure to lead is cumulative and
impacts multiple body systems. WORLD HEALTH ORG., EXPOSURE TO LEAD: A MAJOR PUBLIC
HEALTH CONCERN 1 (2019), https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/329953/WHOCED-PHE-EPE-19.4.7-eng.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/Y6Q7-GAV2]. The World Health
Organization notes that “[c]hildren are particularly vulnerable to the neurotoxic effects of
lead, and even relatively low levels of exposure can cause serious and, in some cases,
irreversible neurological damage.” Id. In addition, “[e]xposure of pregnant women to high
levels of lead can cause miscarriage, stillbirth, premature birth and low birth weight, as well
as minor malformations.” Id. at 4.
102
Warning Letters Cite Cosmetics as Adulterated Due to Microbial Contamination, U.S.
FDA
(Sept.
11,
2020),
https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/warning-letters-relatedcosmetics/warning-letters-cite-cosmetics-adulterated-due-microbial-contamination
[https://perma.cc/U3WZ-EUKJ].
103
Statement from FDA Commissioner, supra note 1.
100
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Bill 2003; and the Cosmetic Modernization Amendments of 2017, House Bill
575.104
The bills have several regulatory features in common. For example, all the
bills would require the reporting of serious adverse events, compliance with
GMP, and the registration of cosmetic establishments.105 However, even where
the bills include the same general type of regulatory requirements, there are
substantial differences.
While all of the bills would require establishment registration, the details of
what the bills would require vary significantly. For example, the establishments
that would be required to register differ. Senate Bill 2100 would require facilities
manufacturing or processing cosmetic products or formulations distributed in
the United States to register.106 Senate Bill 2003 would provide that “the
manufacturer or distributor whose name appears on the label of a cosmetic
marketed in the United States” shall be required “to register all facilities engaged
in manufacturing of such cosmetic.”107 In contrast, House Bill 5279 would
104
Personal Care Products Safety Act, S. 2100, 117th Cong. (2021); Cosmetic Safety
Enhancement Act of 2019, H.R. 5279, 116th Cong. (2019); Safe Cosmetics and Personal Care
Products Act of 2019, H.R. 4296, 116th Cong. (2019); Personal Care Products Safety Act, S.
726, 116th Cong. (2019); FDA Cosmetic Safety and Modernization Act, S. 2003, 115th Cong.
(2017); Cosmetic Modernization Amendments of 2017, H.R. 575, 115th Cong. (2017). While
House Bill 5279 and Senate Bill 726 are related bills, this Article addresses them separately
because they vary, including with respect to preemption. Senate Bill 2100 is essentially
identical to Senate Bill 726 with respect to preemption. Compare S. 2100, with S. 726.
In addition to the bills discussed in the text above, several more narrowly tailored bills have
been introduced: House Bill 1816 would require the labeling of talc in children’s cosmetics
unless the manufacturer attests in writing that the talc is from an asbestos-free mine and
demonstrates that the talc is asbestos free. Children’s Product Warning Label Act of 2019,
H.R. 1816, 116th Cong. (2019). House Bill 5017 would establish standards for the use of the
term “natural” on cosmetic labeling. Natural Cosmetics Act, H.R. 5017, 116th Cong. (2019).
Senate Bill 2886 and House Bill 5141 would prohibit cosmetic animal testing. Humane
Cosmetics Act of 2019, S. 2886, 116th Cong. (2019); Humane Cosmetics Act of 2019, H.R.
5141, 116th Cong. (2019). Senate Bill 2047 and House Bill 3990 would “ban the use of
intentionally added perfluoroalkyl or polyfluoroalkyl substances in cosmetics.” No PFAS in
Cosmetics Act, S. 2047, 117th Cong. (2021); No PFAS in Cosmetics Act, H.R. 3990, 117th
Cong. (2021). Senate Bill 872 would require labeling of cosmetics for professional use;
support research on safer cosmetic design and “promote the use of safer alternatives in
cosmetics” with priority to grant applicants focused on “professional cosmetic products used
by nail, hair, and beauty salon workers,” and “women and girls of color,” and expand support
of “research on health disparities related to cosmetics impacting communities of color.”
Environmental Justice For All Act, S. 872, 117th Cong. §§ 23, 24, 27 (2021). And House
Bill 5548 would require the Environmental Protection Agency to study “the presence
of . . . personal care products in sources of drinking water.” Water, Cosmetics, and Unwanted
Pharmaceuticals Study Act, H.R. 5548, 115th Cong. (2018). As this Article’s focus is broader
cosmetic reform, these narrow bills are not examined in detail. In addition, due to the evolving
nature of the legislative landscape not all recent bills are discussed in this Article.
105
S. 2100; H.R. 5279; H.R. 4296; S. 726; S. 2003; H.R. 575.
106
S. 2100 § 101, at 6.
107
S. 2003 § 5, at 9.
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require the registration of cosmetic manufacturing and processing facilities and
packing or holding facilities.108 As another example, Senate Bill 2100 would
establish registration fees and specific fee setting,109 while House Bill 4296
would provide for the payment of registration fees and the development of a fee
schedule,110 and House Bill 575 would not explicitly provide for registration
fees.111 As a third example, House Bill 5279 would prohibit the failure to
register, provide certain information, or update the information.112 It would also
establish procedures for the Secretary to cancel a facility’s registration if the
Secretary has reasonable grounds to believe that the registration is incomplete
or inaccurate.113 In contrast, House Bill 575 provides that the registration must
“be maintained as current and accurate” and would prohibit failing to register a
cosmetic establishment or failing to maintain the registration;114 however, it
states that the Secretary “shall not suspend or revoke a registration.”115
The bills also vary in how they address the issue of cosmetic safety.116 For
example, the bills would require FDA to review cosmetics, cosmetic ingredients,
or nonfunctional constituents for safety. The process for identifying substances
for review, the number of substances to be reviewed, and timing for review, if
any, vary among the bills. It is unclear how many substances FDA would be able
to realistically review and make final safety determinations for, under the
proposed frameworks.117 Some of the bills would specify the number of

108

H.R. 5279 § 101, at 7-9.
S. 2100 § 202, at 80-89.
110
H.R. 4296 § 2, at 7-8, 11.
111
See H.R. 575, 115th Cong. (2017).
112
H.R. 5279 § 114, at 92-93.
113
Id. § 101, at 12-13.
114
H.R. 575 § 4, at 6, § 11, at 27.
115
Id. § 4, at 6.
116
In addition, three of the bills would specifically address the safety of products for
children, pregnant women, and other vulnerable populations. See H.R. 5279 § 102, at 34-35;
H.R. 4296, 116th Cong. § 2, at 7 (2019); S. 726, 116th Cong. § 102, at 28, § 106, at 55 (2019).
117
FDA has confronted a similar problem in the Over-the-Counter (“OTC”) Drug Review.
See Over-the-Counter Drugs: Proposal Establishing Rule Making Procedures for
Classification, 37 Fed. Reg. 85 (Jan. 5, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130); Drug
Applications for Over-the-Counter (OTC) Drugs, U.S. FDA (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/drug-applications-over-counter-otc-drugs
[https://perma.cc/PB9S-6VXX] (indicating that “there are over 300,000 marketed OTC drug
products”); see also Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L.
No. 116-136, §§ 3851-3853, 134 Stat. 281, 435-54 (2020) (codified in scattered sections of
21 U.S.C.) (reforming the OTC Drug Review process); Why Did the OTC Drug Review Need
to Be Reformed?, Dropdown in Over-the-Counter (OTC) Drug Review: OCT Monograph
Reform in the CARES Act, U.S. FDA (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/over-counterotc-nonprescription-drugs/over-counter-otc-drug-review-otc-monograph-reform-caresact#status [https://perma.cc/269L-4ZWA] (noting that prior to the CARES Act, “[d]espite
FDA’s successes in providing consumers with access to a wide variety of safe and effective
109
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substances to be reviewed each year, but these numbers would constitute only a
small fraction of the number of cosmetic ingredients.118 For example, Senate Bill
2100 would require FDA to review at least five cosmetics or nonfunctional
constituents each year.119 The number of cosmetic ingredients is unknown
because, as noted above, cosmetics are not subject to mandatory ingredient
listing under current law.120 The number of ingredients likely exceeds the
approximately 6,000 ingredients that the cosmetic industry has submitted to
FDA under the Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program.121 Some sources
suggest that there may be over 20,000 cosmetic ingredients.122 Despite the
differences among the regulatory frameworks that the bills would create, none
would require premarket approval of cosmetic ingredients and constituents.123
There are also significant differences among the bills with respect to other
aspects of the regulatory frameworks that they would create. For example, only
five of the six bills would require the submission of ingredient statements.124 In
addition, only three of the bills discussed here would give FDA the authority to
inspect a variety of cosmetic records,125 four would give FDA the authority to
mandate a recall of a cosmetic under certain circumstances,126 and four would
require ingredient labeling for professional-use cosmetics.127 Thus, not all of the
OTC monograph drugs, challenges with the nearly 50-year old OTC Drug Review process
became apparent,” including that “FDA lacked adequate resources to devote to [the]
rulemaking process” and “[d]elays in finalizing monographs”) (choose “Why did the OTC
drug review need to be reformed?” from dropdown).
118
See, e.g., S. 2100, 117th Cong. § 102, at 23-24 (2021).
119
Id.
120
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
121
See Boyer et al., supra note 73, at 7S; Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program, U.S.
FDA (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/voluntary-cosmetic-registrationprogram [https://perma.cc/XC8P-T7LU].
122
See Boyer et al., supra note 73, at 7S (stating that the latest edition of International
Cosmetic Ingredient Dictionary and Handbook lists over 21,000 ingredients); see also U.S.
FDA, PROGRAM 7329.001, COMPLIANCE PROGRAM GUIDANCE MANUAL, ch. 29 (2008)
(archived
at
https://web.archive.org/web/20090528173701/http://www.cfsan.fda.gov
/~acrobat/cp29001.pdf on May 28, 2009).
123
See S. 2100; H.R. 5279, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 4296, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 726,
116th Cong. (2019); S. 2003, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 575, 115th Cong. (2017).
124
Compare S. 2100 § 101, H.R. 5279 § 101, H.R. 4296 § 2, at 44-46, S. 726 § 101, and
H.R. 575 § 2 at 8-10, with S. 2003.
125
Compare S. 2100 § 105, H.R. 5279 § 105, and S. 726 § 105, with S. 2003 § 2, at 4-5,
H.R. 4296, § 2, and H.R. 575. Two are more narrow in scope: Senate Bill 2003 would only
allow for the inspection of records related to serious adverse event reports. S. 2003 § 2, at 45 (proposing section 762(e)). House Bill 4296 would provide for the provision of records
related to certain supply chain information. H.R. 4296 § 2, at 52-54 (proposing section
620(f)).
126
Compare S. 2100 § 105, H.R. 5279 § 105, H.R. 4296 (proposing section 620(d)), and
S. 726 § 105, with S. 2003, and H.R. 575.
127
Compare S. 2100 § 106, at 55-56, H.R. 5279 § 106, at 75, H.R. 4296 § 2, at 13-21, and
S. 726 § 106, at 56, with S. 2003, and H.R. 575.
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bills would fill the gaps in the current regulatory system. Indeed, Congress’s and
FDA’s ability to institute meaningful reform may be hindered by current
information deficits that limit the information available to FDA about even the
most basic facts regarding the industry, such as who is manufacturing what and
where.128
Cosmetic reform should, at a minimum, give FDA the authority to regulate
cosmetics meaningfully. For example, FDA cannot inspect facilities if it does
not even know that the facilities exist and manufacture cosmetics. Its ability to
conduct meaningful inspections of cosmetic manufacturing is limited if it does
not have the authority to inspect manufacturing records. It cannot require
compliance with GMP if the GMP is set forth in nonbinding draft guidance and
guidelines. It cannot adequately monitor the safety of cosmetics if manufacturers
do not have to report serious adverse events. And it cannot monitor the safety of
ingredients that it does not know are being used in cosmetics. If enacted, the
proposed reforms, coupled with information from tort litigation, may help to fill
some of these information deficits, laying the groundwork for a better regulatory
system for cosmetics and, ultimately, safer cosmetics for consumers.

128
The bills vary in terms of their preemption and saving provisions, if any. For example,
the publicly available text of House Bill 5279 contains a saving clause, but no preemption
provision. H.R. 5279, § 113 (providing that nothing in the bill, “nor any standard, rule,
requirement, regulation, adverse event report, safety assessment, safety determination,
scientific assessment, or order issued or implemented pursuant to such amendments, shall be
construed to modify or otherwise affect, preempt, or displace any cause of action or
State . . . law creating a remedy for civil relief . . . , whether statutory or based in common
law”). However, as noted earlier, Representative Pallone acknowledged at a markup session
of the Subcommittee on Health of the Energy and Commerce Committee that the lack of
preemption was “a major issue.” Markup of 13 Health Bills, supra note 21, at 47:24-47:26.
His remarks followed those of (now former) Representative John Shimkus (Illinois), who
noted he had “three main priorities,” the first of which was preemption. Id. at 44:04.
Representative Shimkus continued that the “FDA is the most competent regulator in the nation
[and . . . . i]f they determine something is safe or unsafe, state and local governments should
respect that decision.” Id. at 44:17-44:26; see also Cosmetic Safety Enhancement Act
Advances in US House, supra note 21.
Senate Bill 2100, in contrast, has a preemption clause, which would appear to set a federal
floor with respect to cosmetic safety requirements. S. 2100 § 110; see also S. 726 § 109.
Senate Bill 2100 also contains a saving clause that states that nothing in the proposed
amendments “nor any standard, rule, requirement, regulation, adverse event report, safety
assessment, safety determination, scientific assessment, or order issued or implemented
pursuant to such amendments, shall be construed to modify or otherwise affect, preempt, or
displace any cause of action or State or Federal law creating a remedy for civil relief or
criminal cause of action, whether statutory or based in common law.” S. 2100 § 110, at 67;
see also S. 726 § 109, at 62-63.
As another example, House Bill 575’s preemption provision states that “[n]o State may
establish or enforce a safety determination for a cosmetic or an ingredient or nonfunctional
constituent of a cosmetic,” but contains no saving clause. H.R. 575 § 8, at 23 (proposing
section 609(e)).
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Preemption
1.

Overview

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the
“Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”129 Thus in certain
circumstances, state and local law give way to federal law.
The focus of this Article is on the preemption of state tort law claims. Express
preemption occurs when Congress uses explicit statutory language—an express
preemption provision—to displace state law.130 Congress may couple express
preemption provisions in a statute with savings clauses, which may “save” state
and local laws from express preemption.131 At the heart of the express
preemption analysis is a determination of Congress’s intent, specifically,
whether Congress expressed a preemptive intent.132 The Court has indicated that
this analysis “begin[s] with [the preemption statute’s] text.”133

129

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 270 (“‘Express preemption,’ as
that term is used in current doctrine, deals . . . with . . . the construction of statutory provisions
that expressly address the preemptive effect of federal law.”). While there is no general
express preemption provision in the FDCA, there are several product-specific preemption
provisions, including section 379s, which deals with preemption in the cosmetic context. See
FDCA § 752, 21 U.S.C. § 379s (addressing preemption in the context of “labeling or
packaging of cosmetics”); id. § 760(h), 21 U.S.C. § 379aa(h) (addressing preemption in the
context of “[s]erious adverse event reporting for non-prescription drugs”); id. § 916(a)(2)(A),
21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(2)(A) (addressing preemption in the context of tobacco products); id.
§ 751, 21 U.S.C. § 379r (addressing “[n]ational uniformity for nonprescription drugs”); id.
§ 403A, 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (addressing “[n]ational uniform nutrition labeling”); infra Section
III.C; see also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 618 n.5 (2011) (“The Hatch-Waxman
Amendments contain no provision expressly pre-empting state tort claims.”); Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009) (“If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to
its objectives, it surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point
during the FDCA’s 70-year history. But despite its 1976 enactment of an express pre-emption
provision for medical devices, . . . Congress has not enacted such a provision for prescription
drugs.”); Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA,
48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (2007) (noting that the “[FDCA] does not contain a generally
applicable express preemption provision” and citing several cases recognizing this).
131
Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 467 (2008) (discussing Congress combining “a broad preemption
clause and a seemingly contradictory savings clause”).
132
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (stating that “‘[t]he purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case” (quoting Retail Clerks Int’l
Ass’n, Loc. 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (alteration in original))).
133
Id. at 484.
130
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However, even if federal law does not expressly preempt state law, the Court
may still find that federal law impliedly preempts state law.134 Implied
preemption may occur if “Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy
an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the States to supplement federal
law” (i.e., field preemption).135 It may also occur if there is a conflict between
federal and state law (i.e., conflict preemption). Conflict preemption occurs
“when ‘it is impossible . . . to comply with both state and federal law’ or when
state law ‘[is] an obstacle to . . . the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’”136
From a plaintiff’s perspective, a court holding that her state tort law claims
are preempted has the same effect regardless of the type of preemption—she is
left without the potential for redress and compensation for her injury.
2.

Current Cosmetic Preemption & Saving Clauses

Section 379s of the United States Code (section 752 of the FDCA) contains
an express preemption provision for cosmetics. It provides that, except as
provided in its exemption, product liability, and state initiative subsections:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in
effect any requirement for labeling or packaging of a cosmetic that is
different from or in addition to, or that is otherwise not identical with, a
requirement specifically applicable to a particular cosmetic or class of
cosmetics under [the FDCA], the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of
1970 or the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act.137

134
See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) (“[A]n express pre-emption
clause ‘does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles,’ that find implied
pre-emption ‘where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” (internal citations omitted)).
135
Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016) (quoting Nw. Cent.
Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989)); see also Arizona v. United
States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012) (“Where Congress occupies an entire field, . . . even
complementary state regulation is impermissible.”).
136
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 634 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added) (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73
(2000)); see Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 475 (2013) (discussing impossibility
preemption); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (discussing obstacle preemption).
137
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 752(a), 21 U.S.C. § 379s(a)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Furthermore, section 379s specifies that
a reference to a State requirement that relates to the packaging or labeling of a cosmetic
means any specific requirement relating to the same aspect of such cosmetic as a
requirement specifically applicable to that particular cosmetic or class of cosmetics under
[the FDCA] for packaging or labeling, including any State requirement relating to public
information or any other form of public communication.
Id. § 752(c), 21 U.S.C. § 379s(c).
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The Supreme Court has said that “[a]bsent other indication, reference to a State’s
‘requirements’ includes its common-law duties.”138
However, here, there is indication that a reference to “any requirement” does
not include certain common-law duties as the broad preemption language in
section 379s is coupled with a saving clause.139 That clause provides that
“[n]othing in [section 379s] shall be construed to modify or otherwise affect any
action or the liability of any person under the product liability law of any
State.”140 While that saving clause appears to have been the subject of almost no
discussion or debate in the legislative history,141 the language of the saving
clause appears to clearly express Congress’s intent not to preempt State product
liability actions.142 In addition, until the relatively recent cosmetic-talc litigation,
the operation of the express preemption provision in light of the saving clause
appears to have received little discussion.143 In a recent opinion, the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s “‘failure-to-warn and omission’ claims.”144 It
held that “Congress, through § 379s(d)’s saving clause, expressly preserved
state product liability actions involving cosmetics.”145
138

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324 (2008).
See id.; FDCA § 752(d), 21 U.S.C. § 379s(d).
140
FDCA, § 752(d), 21 U.S.C. § 379s(d). The FDCA also provides that the Secretary of
Health and Human Services may by regulation grant an exemption from preemption for a
state or local labeling or packaging requirement if certain conditions are met. Id. § 752(b), 21
U.S.C. § 379s(b). In addition, the express preemption provision does “not apply to a State
requirement adopted by a State public initiative or referendum enacted prior to September 1,
1997,” an apparent reference to California’s Proposition 65. Id. § 752(e), 21 U.S.C. § 379s(e);
see Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ch. 6.6 (West 1987) (noting that “Chapter 6.6 was added by Initiative Measure, approved by
the people. Nov. 4, 1986, eff. Jan. 1, 1987”); PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE
REAUTHORIZATION AND DRUG REGULATORY MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997, H.R. REP. NO.
105-310, at 117 (1997).
141
See generally S. REP. NO. 105-43 (1997) (discussing the Food & Drug Administration
Modernization and Accountability Act of 1997).
142
See id. at 66 (“[T]he legislation explicitly provides that it shall not be construed to
modify or otherwise affect the traditional product liability law of any State. Tort liability rules
and requirements would remain unchanged and unaffected.”); see also Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (stating that the “saving clause” at issue in that case “at
least removes tort actions from the scope of the express pre-emption clause”).
143
For a discussion of the consideration of section 379s in several recent cosmetic-talc
cases, see infra Section III.C.
144
Potts v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc., No. 20-cv-10406, 2021 WL 2177386, slip
op. at *10 (D.N.J. May 28, 2021).
145
Id.
The caselaw interpreting section 379s appears to focus on claims that are not based on state
product liability law and that raise issues of whether the state labeling or packaging
requirements are “different from or in addition to, or . . . otherwise not identical with, a
requirement specifically applicable to a particular cosmetic or class of cosmetics under [the
139
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Several courts have considered an identically worded saving clause in section
379r(e) for nonprescription drugs.146 Like section 379s, section 379r was added
by the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997.147 The
opinions considering the operation of that saving clause appear to have accepted
that the clause clearly removes from preemption “any action . . . under the
product liability law of any State.”148 What constitutes “product liability law”
has been subject to litigation,149 and courts have held that purely economic
claims are not “product liability law.”150 For example, in a California case
involving the question of whether the plaintiff’s claims against the
manufacturers of over-the-counter drugs for breach of warranty and fraud were
expressly preempted, the court stated:
Under the product liability law of California, injury to the plaintiff from a
defective product is an essential element of a cause of action. Liability may
be imposed either for personal injury or for physical damage to property,
but if the damage consists solely of economic losses, recovery on a
products liability theory is unavailable.151
The conclusion that state tort law claims are not expressly preempted as a
result of the operation of section 379s, however, does not end the inquiry, as
implied preemption may still operate. Indeed, as discussed in Section III.C, both
types of preemption have been raised as a defense by companies in litigation
over cosmetic-talc products.152

FDCA], the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970 or the Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act.” FDCA § 752(a), 21 U.S.C. § 379s(a) (citations omitted); see Critcher v. L’Oreal U.S.,
Inc., 959 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 2020); Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2016)
(en banc); Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 757-59 (9th Cir. 2015); Young
v. L’Oréal, Inc., No. 21-cv-00446, 2021 WL 2295625, slip op. at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2021);
Canale v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 258 F. Supp. 3d 312, 319-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Bimont v.
Unilever U.S., Inc., No. 14-cv-07749, 2015 WL 5256988, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2015).
146
Compare FDCA §751(e), 21 U.S.C. § 379r(e), with id. § 752, 21 U.S.C. § 379s(d).
147
See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115,
sec. 412, §§ 751, 752, 111 Stat. 2296, 2374, 2376 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 379r, 379s).
148
See Carter v. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1286-87 (C.D.
Cal. 2008); Mills v. Warner-Lambert Co., 581 F. Supp. 2d 772, 790-91 (E.D. Tex. 2008);
Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72, 78-81 (Ct. App. 2002).
149
Carter, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1287; Mills, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 790-93; Kanter, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 80-81.
150
Carter, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1287; Mills, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 790-93; Kanter, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 80-81; see also Peters v. AstraZeneca, LP, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (W.D. Wis.
2006) (stating that express preemption was not at issue in a products liability suit).
151
Kanter, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 80-81 (citations omitted).
152
See infra Section III.C.
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II.

WHY THE PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT LAW MAY HINDER GENDER &
RACIAL EQUITY IN THE COSMETIC CONTEXT
There is a long history of women turning to tort law in the face of regulatory
inaction and failures.153 Congress did not include cosmetics in the Pure Food
and Drug Act of 1906 (“1906 Act”).154 But in the years following the passage of
the 1906 Act, the cosmetic industry—and concerns about the limitations of the
1906 Act and the safety of cosmetics—grew.155 One cosmetic product—
“Koremlu Cream”—discussed in testimony on proposed legislation to remedy
some of the limitations of the 1906 Act,156 for example, was the subject of
lawsuits by women who alleged that the product had injured them. Some of their
claims were tort claims.157 Furthermore, in the over eighty years since Congress
153

Matters of health and safety and state tort law are two areas that have been viewed as
traditional domains of the states. See, e.g., Barbara L. Atwell, Products Liability and
Preemption: A Judicial Framework, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 181, 188 (1991) (“Where areas of
traditional state regulation such as health and safety are involved, the Supreme Court has been
particularly reluctant to preempt state law. Restraint concerning preemption of state laws
addressing health and safety also extends to state tort laws.”).
154
See generally Federal Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
155
See Boyd, supra note 6, at 310-11 (citing statistics regarding the industry’s growth and
discussing the failures of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906).
156
See, e.g., CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A
STATEMENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD 1154 (1938).
157
In its report for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1933, FDA indicated that Koremlu Cream
“represented as entirely harmless and actually beneficial to the skin, contained a highly
poisonous chemical—thallium acetate” and “[i]ts widespread utilization for the removal of
superfluous hair caused many cases of severe injury to users before the manufacturer was
forced into bankruptcy by accumulation of damage suits.” Id. at 26. One historian indicates
that “[w]omen who had been injured [by Koremlu] sued the company and were awarded
damages in excess of $2.5 million,” but that they did not receive money after the company
declared bankruptcy and failed. GWEN KAY, DYING TO BE BEAUTIFUL: THE FIGHT FOR SAFE
COSMETICS 71 (2005). Although the basis of the women’s claims is not indicated, at least
some plaintiffs brought torts claims against the company. See, e.g., Hillick v. E. W. Edwards
& Son, 256 N.Y.S. 313, 316 (Sup. Ct. 1932), modified, 257 N.Y.S. 945 (App. Div. 1932)
(stating that each plaintiff “alleges that she has suffered injurious consequences from the use
of ‘Koremlu Cream,’ a depilatory preparation which, it is claimed, was negligently, carelessly
and illegally prepared by the defendants Kora M. Lublin ‘and/or’ Koremlu, Inc., in that it
contained certain chemicals or drugs which were poisonous and dangerous to human life and
health; that said Koremlu cream was misrepresented and sold by the defendant retailers E. W.
Edwards & Son and Abraham & Straus, Inc., with reckless disregard of injurious
consequences which might follow from its prescribed use”); cf. Smith v. Denholm & McKay
Co., 192 N.E. 631, 631-32 (Mass. 1934) (stating that plaintiff waived her tort claim and
proceeded on contract claims in action “brought to recover damages for injuries arising from
the use of . . . ‘Koremlu’”). For another example of a tort claim involving a cosmetic that
predated the FDCA, see Bundy v. Ey-Teb, Inc., 289 N.Y.S. 905, 905-07 (City Ct. 1935),
which found $2,000 for the plaintiff in an action for negligence against a corporation where
“[p]laintiff suffered painful and serious injury as a result of the application to her eyes of a
preparation designed to darken eyebrows or lashes and put on the market for such purpose by
defendant corporation.” Id.
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enacted the FDCA, people have continued to bring tort claims against companies
making, distributing, and selling cosmetics for injuries that they allege the
cosmetics caused.158
This Part considers how tort liability for defective or unreasonably dangerous
cosmetics may complement the federal cosmetic regulation by providing redress
and compensating injured plaintiffs, encouraging manufacturers to take due
care, and bringing to light information that may inform the regulation of
cosmetics. This Part argues that the preemption of state tort law would have a
disparate impact on women, particularly women who are members of other
historically excluded groups, and may worsen gender and racial inequities.
Despite its limitations, state tort law may help protect women and people of color
from unsafe cosmetics, and Congress should not preempt it in the course of
enacting cosmetic reform. The following Part continues by examining the
plaintiffs’ claims in Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson and exploring how many of
the considerations discussed in this Part may apply in the context of talccontaining cosmetics.
A.

Why Preempting Tort Law in the Cosmetic Context May Have a
Disparate Impact on Women & Particularly Women Who Are Members of
Historically Excluded Groups

The preemption of state tort law claims concerning cosmetics may have a
disparate impact on women and their health and safety.159 This is because, as
discussed in my prior work, Gender, Race & the Inadequate Regulation of
Cosmetics, women may be at higher risk of experiencing adverse effects from

158
See, e.g., Gober v. Revlon, Inc., 317 F.2d 47, 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1963) (affirming verdict
in favor of consumer in action that included failure to warn claim); Third Amended Class
Action Complaint at 31-35, Friedman v. Guthy-Renker, LLC, No. 02:14-cv-06009 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 31, 2016), ECF No. 180 (alleging, among other things, negligence, failure to warn and
failure to test, and strict products liability); In re Brazilian Blowout Litig., No. 10-cv-08452,
2011 WL 10962891, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2011) (stating that Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Class Action Complaint alleged, among other things, negligence); Pleading at 15-16, Frye v.
L’Oreal U.S., Inc., No. 08-cv-00213 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2008) (alleging, among other things,
strict liability and negligence per se); Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D.
Tenn. 1978) (granting defendant’s motion for a new trial only on the issue of damages);
McKinney v. Revlon, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72, 73, 75-76 (Ct. App. 1992) (affirming “trial
court’s imposition of liability for appellant’s inadequate warning of known dangers” where
plaintiff “filed a products liability complaint against Revlon alleging negligence and strict
liability theories”); see also infra Section III.B (discussing litigation related to talcum body
powders).
159
See WILLIAM FUNK, SIDNEY SHAPIRO, DAVID VLADEK & KAREN SOKOL, THE TRUTH
ABOUT TORTS: USING AGENCY PREEMPTION TO UNDERCUT CONSUMER HEALTH AND SAFETY
11 (2007); see also WILLIAM BUZBEE, WILLIAM FUNK, THOMAS MCGARITY, NINA
MENDELSON, SIDNEY SHAPIRO, DAVID VLADEK & MATTHEW SHUDTZ, THE TRUTH ABOUT
TORTS: RETHINKING REGULATORY PREEMPTION AND ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC HEALTH 3-4
(2009).

2022]

PREEMPTION & GENDER & RACIAL (IN)EQUITY

197

cosmetics than men.160 Cosmetics, both as products and an industry, are highly
gendered.161 For example, “[o]n average, women use more cosmetics than
men.”162 Women are significantly more likely than men to have jobs that may
involve cosmetic exposure, such as hairdressers, hairstylists, and
cosmetologists, and to be employed in beauty salons, nail salons, and other
personal care services.163 In addition, cosmetic advertisements often specifically
target women.164
Data on cosmetic injuries are limited. Current law does not require the
submission of adverse event reports for cosmetics.165 The director of FDA’s
Office of Cosmetics and Colors has indicated that “[n]ot having mandatory
reporting of adverse events by manufacturers often means that [FDA is] just
seeing the tip of the iceberg in” the Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition’s Adverse Event Reporting System (“CAERS”) for cosmetics.166 The
submission of an adverse event report does not necessarily mean that a cosmetic
caused the event.167 Nevertheless, adverse event reports “are important because
it’s one of the few tools FDA has to monitor possible safety problems with
cosmetics.”168 The consumers reported as experiencing adverse events in
CAERS are 92% female, according to a slide deck from a 2017 presentation by
the Director of FDA’s Office of Cosmetics and Colors.169

160

See Boyd, supra note 6, at 289-95; Anita Bernstein, Fellow-Feeling and Gender in the
Law of Personal Injury, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 295, 302 (2009) (“Other female plaintiffs fall in a
disparate impact category: women happened to encounter a particular dangerous product
much more than men.”).
161
Boyd, supra note 6, at 289.
162
See id. at 289-90; supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
163
Boyd, supra note 6, at 290-91.
164
See HELEN RINGROW, THE LANGUAGE OF COSMETICS ADVERTISING 2 (2016) (“The
majority of cosmetics are marketed using the message that the female appearance can be
improved with the aid of products . . . .”).
165
Using Adverse Event Reports, supra note 10.
166
Id.
167
See, e.g., LINDA M. KATZ, COSMETIC ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING IN THE U.S. 8 (2017)
[hereinafter
KATZ,
COSMETIC
ADVERSE
EVENT
REPORTING],
http://eservices.personalcarecouncil.org/science/17ss/presentations/katz.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RCL-YG7S] (explaining limitations of CAERS data); FDA Begins Posting
Adverse Event Report Data for Foods and Cosmetics, U.S. FDA (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/food/cfsan-constituent-updates/fda-begins-posting-adverse-eventreport-data-foods-and-cosmetics [https://perma.cc/HP77-48BU] (stating that FDA “has not
necessarily determined if the product(s) in question were the actual cause of the events
reported”); see also Saya L. Jacob, Erika Cornell, Michael Kwa, William E. Funk & Shuai
Xu, Commentary, Cosmetics and Cancer: Adverse Event Reports Submitted to the Food and
Drug Administration, 2 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1, 2 (2018) (discussing limitations of
reporting).
168
Using Adverse Event Reports, supra note 10.
169
KATZ, COSMETIC ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING, supra note 167, at 12.
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That women may be disproportionately at risk of injury from cosmetics is
consistent with Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad’s argument that “[s]pecific
injuries vary significantly by sex” and there are “his and her” torts.170 They note
that “[t]he product injuries sustained by women plaintiffs in punitive damages
cases occurred in traditionally female spheres.”171 They indicate that compared
to men, women are more likely to be injured by beauty products.172 They also
note that “household products” injuries occurred “in gender stereotypical
ways.”173 Two of the three examples they provide of “[f]emales [who] were
awarded punitive damages for having been injured at home” involve
cosmetics—“a skin cream containing mercury”174 and an “artificial fingernail
glue.”175
The preemption of cosmetic claims may also have a disparate impact on
women who are members of other historically excluded groups who may be at
an even higher risk of having adverse effects from cosmetics. Spending data
suggests that Black women buy and use more cosmetics than the general
population.176 In addition, “there also may be racial differences in the types of
cosmetics women use” and how they use them.177 For example, “African
American and African Caribbean women are more likely [than White women]
to use a greater number and variety of hair products and to have their hair
chemically or professionally treated.”178
Manufacturers may engage in racially targeted advertising of products that
may have health implications for people of color.179 Advertising, product use,
170
Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in
Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 33 (1995); see also Bernstein, supra note 160, at 301
(“[G]ender in the United States has been especially central to the phenomenon of claiming
and receiving compensation for injuries ascribed to defective products.”).
171
Koenig & Rustad, supra note 170, at 38.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 38 n.146 (citing Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D. Tenn.
1978)); see Dean, 450 F. Supp. at 3 (granting defendant’s motion for a new trial on the issue
of damages).
175
Koenig & Rustad, supra note 170, at 38 n.146 (citing Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee,
Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 1980)); see Kicklighter, 616 F.2d at 745 (reversing the
judgment against the third-party defendant, a supplier of the defendant, and the defendant;
remanding for a new trial; and affirming the judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of
the defendant on punitive damages).
176
Boyd, supra note 6, at 291 & nn.97-99 (discussing and citing works on differences in
the use of and exposure to cosmetics).
177
Id. at 291 & nn.100-02, 294 & nn.124-27.
178
Zota & Shamasunder, supra note 34, at 419.
179
Ross D. Petty, Anne-Marie G. Harris, Toni Broaddus & William M. Boyd III,
Regulating Target Marketing and Other Race-Based Advertising Practices, 8 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 335, 349 (2003) (examining targeted marketing techniques and how “race-based
advertising practices can create negative results when harmful products, such as cigarettes or
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and race are often intertwined, and the cosmetic industry has a long history of
reinforcing “white-centred beauty ideals.”180 One author described the
relationship between Black women and the cosmetic industry as
“complicated . . . symbolis[ing] equality and increased representation, but also
manipulation and exploitation.”181
Employment in jobs that involve the use of cosmetics may also vary by
race.182 For example, according to United States Bureau of Labor Statistics data
cited earlier, in 2020, 79.3% of manicurists and pedicurists were women and
76.7% were Asian, whereas only 14.2% were White.183 In comparison, 90.8%
of hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists were women, and 77.5% were
White, whereas only 5.1% were Asian.184 In addition, “[t]he cosmetics that
women who are members of other excluded groups are exposed to . . . . may be
more hazardous.”185 For example, an analysis by the EWG found that “[f]ewer
than one-fourth of the products marketed to Black women scored low in
potentially hazardous ingredients, compared to about 40 percent of the items in
[EWG’s cosmetic database] marketed to the general public.”186
B.

How Tort Law May Complement & Reinforce the Regulation of
Cosmetics

Tort law may play several important roles in complementing the regulatory
system for cosmetics.187 If a defective or unreasonably dangerous cosmetic
injures someone, the tort system provides a mechanism by which that person
may seek compensation for their injury. The tort system also may incentivize
cosmetic manufacturers to take due care or otherwise change their activities to
reduce potential harms.
alcohol, are marketed more heavily toward minority consumers than toward the general
population”); see also Zota & Shamasunder, supra note 34, at 419 (discussing
“disproportionate beauty product exposures among vulnerable populations” and citing
various studies).
180
Melissa L. Baird, ‘Making Black More Beautiful’: Black Women and the Cosmetics
Industry in the Post-Civil Rights Era, 33 GENDER & HIST. 557, 562 (2021). See generally
Imani Perry, Buying White Beauty, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 579, 587 (2006) (discussing
white-centric beauty standards, skin-bleaching, and history of “colonialism, neocolonialism,
and most recently, economic globalization,” shaping beauty standards).
181
Baird, supra note 180, at 571.
182
Boyd, supra note 6, at 292 & nn.103-04.
183
Labor Force Statistics, supra note 33.
184
Id.
185
Boyd, supra note 6, at 294 & nn.124-127; see also Helm et al., supra note 35, at 456
(“Given the exposure and endocrine-mediated health disparities experienced by Black
women, new research and regulatory activities should consider the effects of ethnic
differences in product use on exposures and health.”).
186
Big Market for Black Cosmetics, supra note 35.
187
See Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44
S.C. L. REV. 187, 251 (1993) (“Both federal product safety legislation and state products
liability doctrines promote public health and safety, though in different ways.”).

200

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:167

1. Providing Redress
First, given cosmetics’ gendered and racialized nature, tort law—“a law for
the redress of wrongs”—may serve a particularly important function.188 The
FDCA gives FDA the authority to regulate cosmetics, but it confers no private
right of action.189 Tort law, in contrast, empowers people to demand a response
for a wrong they have suffered.190 In doing so, it “affirms their status as persons
who are entitled not to be mistreated by others” in a way that “[e]x ante safety
regulations” may not.191 “As a forum that is in principle available to anyone who
has been victimized in a certain way,” tort law may show people that “the
government has a certain level of concern for their lives, liberties, and
prospects.”192 This function may be especially important in the cosmetic context
because the inadequacies of the current regulatory scheme send the opposite
message: one of the reasons cosmetics are underregulated is that they “are
closely associated with femininity, [and] traits and qualities associated with
women or femininity have been devalued.”193 In addition, the potentially
empowering aspects of tort law may be particularly important in the cosmetic
context because the people injured may be more likely to be women, including
women who are members of other historically excluded groups, and there is a
long history of discrimination against these groups—including by the federal
and state governments.194 The preemption of state tort law claims for defective
or unreasonably dangerous cosmetics would have the practical effect of
preventing people—disproportionately women, including women who are
members of other historically excluded groups—injured by such cosmetics from
obtaining redress through the tort law system.

188

See generally John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process
and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005).
189
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 310, 21 U.S.C. § 337 (providing that,
except as specified in Section 337(b), “all . . . proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain
violations, of [the FDCA] shall be by and in the name of the United States” and providing no
explicit private right of action); see, e.g., Beck & Valentine, supra note 39, at 402 & n.96
(asserting that “court decisions over the last two decades have unanimously precluded private
actions for alleged FDCA violations when styled as private rights of action” and citing
decisions to support the assertion).
190
Goldberg, supra note 188, at 601-07.
191
Id. at 607.
192
Id. But see infra Section II.C.2 (discussing gender and racial injustice throughout tort
law).
193
Boyd, supra note 6, at 318; see also Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep
Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 474-80 (1998) (discussing how women and
their activities have been devalued); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex
and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105
YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1995).
194
See Boyd, supra note 6, at 275.

2022]

PREEMPTION & GENDER & RACIAL (IN)EQUITY

201

2. Compensating Injured People
Second, the preemption of state tort law claims for defective or unreasonably
dangerous cosmetics also would eliminate the possibility that people—again
disproportionately women, including women who are members of other
historically excluded groups—injured by a defective or unreasonably dangerous
cosmetic could receive compensation for their loss or injury through the tort
system in the form of damages. Tort damages aim to compensate the plaintiff
for their loss or injury and put them back into the position they were in before
the injury occurred (i.e., to “make-whole”) to the extent possible with money.195
Indeed, “[c]ompensation of persons injured by wrongdoing is one of the
generally accepted aims of tort law.”196 And, as discussed in more detail in
Section II.C.2 below, even the imperfect compensatory function of tort law is
likely better for injured persons than no compensation at all. Partial and
imperfect compensation help to shift at least part of the loss off the injured
person.197
While the preemption landscape for products regulated by FDA is complex,
state tort law has not been preempted and continues to provide a potential
remedy for people injured by some products regulated by FDA, even where such
products are subject to more stringent regulation than cosmetics. For example,

195

See, e.g., Andrew Jay McClurg, It’s a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages
in Wrongful Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 66 (1990) (“This compensatory
function of tort law finds more specific expression in the ‘make whole’ principle, according
to which the object of tort damages is to restore the tort victim as nearly as possible to the
position he would have been in had the injury not occurred.”); Pam A. Mueller, Victimhood
& Agency: How Taking Charge Takes Its Toll, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 691, 694-95 (2017) (stating
that an “important goal of the civil justice system—particularly within tort law . . . is to make
this victim whole” and that “[g]enerally, making a victim whole means compensating him
financially to the extent necessary to return him to his previous position or as near as possible”
(citations omitted)); see also Barbara Young Welke, The Cowboy Suit Tragedy: Spreading
Risk, Owning Hazard in the Modern American Consumer Economy, 101 J. AM. HIST. 97, 100
(2014) (“[T]he burden of owning hazard in the goods of everyday life rests where it first
materializes on the bodies and lives of individuals.”).
196
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 41, § 2.4, at 21.
197
From a loss-spreading standpoint, tort law may be beneficial in that it may help to shift
(some of) the loss off the person injured by the defective or unreasonably dangerous cosmetic
and spread the loss across many. Ronen Avraham & Kimberly Yuracko, Torts and
Discrimination, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 661, 693 (2017) (discussing the loss-spreading theory of
distributive justice in tort law). This may be beneficial “because small, predictable losses
[may] hurt less than abrupt losses that are considerable and unpredictable.” Id. This may,
however, have negative secondary accident costs because the people to whom these costs may
shift—other users of cosmetics—may be more likely to be women, including women who are
members of other historically excluded groups. Id. However, a well-functioning regulatory
structure may help to address this problem by using information obtained from the tort law
system about product risks to better tailor regulation to the risks and ultimately reduce injuries
and the costs of such injuries. See id.
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drugs, which FDA regulates far more stringently than cosmetics,198 are not
subject to an express preemption provision, and the Supreme Court has held that
failure-to-warn claims against the manufacturer of a (brand-name) prescription
drug are not preempted.199 As a result, someone injured by such a drug in a way
that the drug failed to warn about may bring a state tort law claim against the
manufacturer.200
In contrast to the tort system, a central aim of which is compensation,201 the
regulatory system for cosmetics does not provide compensation to people
injured by defective or unreasonably dangerous cosmetics.202 Moreover, while
Congress could enact an alternative compensation system for cosmetics as part
of cosmetic reform, it is unlikely to do so. None of the recent cosmetic bills
would have established such a system.203 Although Congress has established
alternate compensation systems in other contexts, those contexts can be
distinguished from cosmetics. For example, in the food and drug context,
Congress has established a compensation program for people injured by
vaccines, an important public health tool.204 It has also established measures to

198
A drug, for example, must have FDA approval before it may be marketed in the United
States. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 505(a), 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
199
See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009) (noting that Congress has not enacted
an express preemption clause for prescription drugs).
200
See id. In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that state failure-to-warn claims and
certain state law design-defect claims involving generic drugs are preempted. See Mut. Pharm.
Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 476 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 608-09
(2011). Some state claims involving medical devices are preempted under the Medical Device
Amendments preemption clause. FDCA § 521(a), 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a); Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) (holding that certain state claims are preempted under the
Medical Device Amendments preemption clause).
201
See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
202
The FDCA does not provide a private right of action. See FDCA § 310, 21 U.S.C.
§ 337.
203
See Personal Care Products Safety Act, S. 2100, 117th Cong. (2021); Cosmetic Safety
Enhancement Act of 2019, H.R. 5279, 116th Cong. (2019); Safe Cosmetics and Personal Care
Products Act of 2019, H.R. 4296, 116th Cong. (2019); Personal Care Products Safety Act, S.
726, 116th Cong. (2019); FDA Cosmetic Safety and Modernization Act, S. 2003, 115th Cong.
(2017); Cosmetic Modernization Amendments of 2017, H.R. 575, 115th Cong. (2017).
204
See About the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RES. & SERVS.
ADMIN. (Jan. 2022) [hereinafter About VICP], https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/R9XD-F7N9]. The National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (“VICP”), created by the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986 (the “Vaccine Act”), is a “no-fault” compensation system for vaccine
injuries, funded by an excise tax on vaccines. Id.; see National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to
-34). Vaccines have been recognized as “one of the greatest achievements of biomedical
science and public health.” See CDC, Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States,
1900-1999, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 241, 247 (1999). Routine childhood
vaccination in the United States is estimated to prevent “322 million illnesses, 21 million
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compensate people injured by covered countermeasures—items used to prevent,
diagnose, or treat a public health emergency or a security threat—such as
vaccines, medications, and devices.205 There is nothing to suggest that Congress
hospitalizations, and 732,000 deaths” among children born between 1994-2013 during their
lifetimes. Cynthia G. Whitney, Fangjun Zhou, James Singleton & Anne Schuchat, Benefits
from Immunization During the Vaccines for Children Program Era—United States, 19942013, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 352, 352 (2014). The benefits of vaccines
are not limited to reducing the rate of disease and the asymptomatic carrier state. C. Lee
Ventola, Immunization in the United States: Recommendations, Barriers, and Measures to
Improve Compliance, Part 1: Childhood Vaccinations, 41 PHARM. & THERAPEUTICS 426, 426
(2016). When enough people are vaccinated, unvaccinated people also benefit from a
“reduced risk of exposure to pathogens” (i.e., “herd immunity”). Id. Despite these substantial
benefits, “[i]n very rare cases, a vaccine can cause a serious problem.” Overview, History,
and
How
the
Safety
Process
Works,
CDC
(Sept.
9,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/ensuringsafety/history
/index.html#four [https://perma.cc/QGA5-NBR8]. Prior to enacting the Vaccine Act,
Congress was concerned that, without intervention, vaccine manufacturers would leave the
market because of potential liability and product liability insurance costs, thereby creating a
shortage of vaccines. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6344, 6348. There were only one or two manufacturers of several childhood vaccines, and a
House Report on the legislation indicates that “[t]he loss of any of the existing manufacturers
of childhood vaccines . . . could create a genuine public health hazard.” Id. Congress enacted
the VICP to “ensure an adequate supply of vaccines,” “stabilize vaccine costs,” and “establish
and maintain an accessible and efficient forum for individuals found to be injured by certain
vaccines.” About VICP, supra.
205
42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d; see also Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 15198
(Mar. 17 2020) (addressing COVID-19 public health emergency); HEALTH RES. & SERVS.
ADMIN.,
COUNTERMEASURES
INJURY
COMPENSATION
PROGRAM
(2020),
https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/hrsa/cicp/cicpfactsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR3CYK8X]; Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP), HEALTH RES. & SERVS.
ADMIN. (Nov. 2020), https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp [https://perma.cc/5JLK-EJR6]. While a
comprehensive review of alternate compensation programs is beyond the scope of this Article,
there are a variety of other compensation programs, which include, for example, those related
to government activities (e.g., nuclear weapon development), specific events (e.g., September
11th attacks), and occupational disease (e.g., black lung disease). See, e.g., Program Benefits,
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/owcp/energy/regs/compliance
/progbenefits [https://perma.cc/3E95-XHZE] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022) (describing the
Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program); Radiation Exposure
Compensation Act, U.S. DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/civil/common/reca [https://perma.cc
/XU79-2Z8Y] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (describing the “administrative program for claims
relating to atmospheric nuclear testing and uranium industry employment”); SEPT. 11TH
VICTIM
COMP.
FUND,
https://www.vcf.gov/
[https://perma.cc
/XHG9-CLLF] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (describing the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund); Black Lung Program, U.S. DOJ, https://www.dol.gov/agencies
/owcp/dcmwc [https://perma.cc/CH9S-ZQZ9] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022) (stating that Black
Lung Benefits Act “provides compensation to coal miners who are totally disabled by
pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment, and to survivors of coal miners whose
deaths are attributable to the disease” and “provides eligible miners with medical coverage
for the treatment of lung diseases related to pneumoconiosis”).
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would find an alternative compensation system for cosmetics warranted. Thus,
if cosmetic claims were preempted, people, disproportionately women,
including members of other excluded groups, injured by cosmetics may be left
without compensation for their injuries,206 which raises equity concerns. More
broadly, if the claims involving female-gendered products are more likely to be
preempted than similar claims that involve products that are more likely to injure
men, this is concerning.
3.

Encouraging Due Care & More

Third, tort litigation may have “radiating effects.”207 For example, tort law
aims “to deter certain kinds of conduct by imposing liability when that conduct
causes harm.”208 Thus tort law may encourage those who make, sell, and
distribute cosmetics to take due care to avoid potential tort liability.209 This
function may help make cosmetics safer by providing feedback to cosmetic
industry members that they should take greater safety precautions to avoid such
liability. In this way, tort law may complement and help reinforce the regulatory
system. And while tort law may under deter in the cosmetic context, because of
gender and racial bias and discrimination,210 any deterrent effect is likely better
than none—the result if tort law claims were preempted.
Deterrence is not the only way in which the possibility of tort liability may
influence behavior. Tort litigation and the normative messages it conveys can
“have broader social significance.”211 For example, in The Radiating Effects of
Torts, Anne Bloom considers the radiating effect of tobacco litigation in altering
public perceptions, “refram[ing] policy debates and contribut[ing] to the
formation of new social norms.”212 Bloom states that “[u]ltimately, the
206
Worker’s compensation may cover some cosmetics-related injuries. See BabcockBucklin v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 202 Cal. Rptr. 670, 670, 672, 674 (Ct. App. 1984)
(discussing hairstylist’s workers’ compensation claim after exposure to chemicals used in
beauty shop where she worked); Ocean Reef Club, Inc. v. Wilczewski, 99 So. 3d 1, 2 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing workers’ compensation in the context of a tort action brought
by plaintiffs employed as a hairstylist and nail technician who alleged “to have been exposed
to chemical fumes inherent in the operation of the beauty salon which caused them to
experience [injuries] . . . for which they had to receive medical treatment and
hospitalization”). But see Amanda A. Lee, Maia Ingram, Carolina Quijada, Andres Yubeta,
Imelda Cortez, Nathan Lothrop & Paloma Beamer, Responsibility for Chemical Exposures:
Perspectives from Small Beauty Salons and Auto Shops in Southern Metropolitan Tucson, 21
BMC PUB. HEALTH 271, 272 (2021) (noting that many Latinx workers in the beauty industry
“do not understand or are not offered workers’ compensation benefits in cases of workplace
injuries” such as exposure to toxic agents).
207
Anne Bloom, The Radiating Effects of Torts, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 229, 233 (2013).
208
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 41, § 2.5, at 23.
209
See id. (stating that the “idea of deterrence” is that “all persons, recognizing potential
tort liability, would tend to avoid conduct such that could lead to tort liability”).
210
See infra Section II.C.2.
211
Bloom, supra note 207, at 233.
212
Id. at 240.
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normative messages generated by the litigation proved helpful in resetting the
policy agenda.”213 And, perhaps more relevant for the cosmetic industry, given
the recent allegations that some talc products contained asbestos, Bloom writes
that “asbestos litigation seems to have altered the balance of power in the
asbestos policymaking setting.”214 In the cosmetic context, tort litigation could
have a similar effect. It may change how people view the industry, what they
expect from regulation, and how they value and use cosmetics.215 And in so
doing, it may reframe the policy debates over cosmetic regulation and help pave
the way for meaningful reform.
In addition, Bloom considers how tort law can impact social hierarchies—
either restructuring identities and social hierarchies or reproducing them.216 As
noted earlier, being able to invoke claims for injuries may empower those who
have been injured and “shape[] identity and perceptions of political
opportunity.”217 In light of this, preempting state tort law claims in the cosmetic
context may send a message of invisibility, exclusion, and powerlessness to
people harmed by cosmetics.218 This outcome may be particularly destructive
given that these people may be disproportionately women and women who are
members of other historically excluded groups.
4.

Facilitating Information Access

One of the classic justifications for administrative agencies is that Congress
delegates power to agencies because agencies’ expertise and specialized
knowledge make them better suited to make certain types of decisions.219 Many
proponents of broad federal preemption of state tort law actions argue that
agencies—and not lay juries—should decide how product risks and benefits are
weighed because of their expertise, particularly in the health and safety

213

Id.; see also Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and
Tobacco Litigation, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 897, 936 (1998).
214
Bloom, supra note 207, at 240; see also Lisa Girion, Johnson & Johnson Knew for
Decades that Asbestos Lurked in its Baby Powder, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2018, 2:00 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/johnsonandjohnson-cancer/
[https://perma.cc/8XF5-B7DV].
215
See Bloom, supra note 207, at 234.
216
Id. at 232-37.
217
Id. at 237. But see id. at 245 (“The radiating effects of torts also likely help to enforce
and construct social hierarchies along the lines of gender and race.”).
218
Id. at 237; see also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 164
(1991) (describing rights as “the magic wand of visibility and invisibility, of inclusion and
exclusion, of power and no power”).
219
See Barry Sullivan & Christine Kexel Chabot, The Science of Administrative Change,
52 CONN. L. REV. 1, 27 (2020) (discussing the history of expertise as a justification for agency
authority). This advantage, however, might not be as great as “an abstract comparison of the
nature of [experts and civil juries] might suggest.” FUNK ET AL., supra note 159, at 15.
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context.220 However, the idea of an expert decision-maker is premised on the
notion that that decision-maker will have access to information to make a
determination.221 Taken to an extreme, if no information is available, the agency
has nothing on which to base its decision. As Mary J. Davis has argued,
“common law tort doctrines should continue to play a role in the regulatory
framework” because there “is [a] need for an alternative, complementary
mechanism to the typically static administrative regulatory framework to
encourage the disclosure of, and promote responses to, constantly evolving risk
information.”222
FDA is “undoubtedly an expert agency.”223 Its mission is to protect and
promote the public health.224 Specifically, “[FDA] is responsible for protecting
the public health by ensuring . . . the safety of . . . cosmetics.”225 But under
current law, FDA’s ability to collect even basic information about cosmetics and
their risks is limited.226 As noted above, FDA does not have the authority to
mandate establishment or product registration, require adverse event reporting,
or generally inspect records.227 For example, FDA noted that in the course of
inspecting facilities for certain cosmetic products, it “learned that consumers had
reported reactions in more than 21,000 complaints submitted to . . . the
companies that market and manufacture the products.”228 However, “[t]he law
does not require cosmetic companies to share their safety information, including
consumer complaints, with the FDA, nor does the law require mandatory
reporting of adverse events to the FDA.”229 And even if Congress were to give
220

See Mary J. Davis, The Case Against Preemption: Vaccines & Uncertainty, 8 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 293, 293 (2011).
221
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (“After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the
agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose.”); Id. § 554(a) (“This section applies . . . in every case of adjudication required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing . . . .”); Sullivan
& Chabot, supra note 219, at 6 (“Expert decisions often turn, not on the mastery of static
bodies of information, but on the assessment of evolving scientific, technological, or
economic knowledge.”).
222
Davis, supra note 220, at 294. But see Sullivan & Chabot, supra note 219, at 6
(“[A]dministrative agencies, amongst all government decisionmakers, are uniquely situated
to incorporate evolving scientific, technological, or economic information into sound
regulatory decisions . . . .”).
223
K.M. Lewis, Informal Guidance and the FDA, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 507, 535 (2011).
224
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 1003, 21 U.S.C. § 393; What We
Do, U.S. FDA (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/W6AA-WN4D].
225
What We Do, supra note 224.
226
See, e.g., Information for Consumers About WEN, supra note 4 (“The law does not
require cosmetic companies to share their safety information, including consumer complaints,
with the FDA, nor does the law require mandatory reporting of adverse events to the FDA.”).
227
See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
228
Information for Consumers About WEN, supra note 4.
229
Id.
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FDA the authority to collect this information, tort law can help bring to light
additional information about the risks that cosmetics may pose and with which
members of the cosmetic industry may not be forthcoming.230 Such information
may come from the company making, distributing, or selling the regulated
product in civil discovery in the context of tort litigation.231 It may also come as
a result of litigation publicity.232
C.

The Intersecting Failures of Cosmetic Regulation, Healthcare & Tort Law
1.

Disparities in Healthcare

Women, including women who are members of other excluded groups, are
not only disproportionately put at risk by the inadequate regulation of cosmetics,
but, if they are injured by a cosmetic and seek medical care, they do so within a
medical and healthcare system in which there are significant gender-based
disparities. For example, “[h]istorically, women have been excluded from or
underrepresented in the drug development process, and in clinical research in
particular.”233 For years, FDA’s guidelines “largely excluded women from
clinical trials” for drugs.234 As a result, research was “conducted predominately
with only white male participants and then the results of those studies were

230

See, e.g., FUNK ET AL., supra note 159, at 11 (discussing how “the federal regulatory
system permits drug and medical-device manufacturers to evade safety requirements and
maintain strict control of information on the health risks presented by their products” and
stating that “[t]ort law is necessary . . . to highlight dangers that FDA misses or fails to
address”); Christopher J. Morten & Amy Kapczynski, The Big Data Regulator, Rebooted:
Why and How the FDA Can and Should Disclose Confidential Data on Prescription Drugs
and Vaccines, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 493, 516 (2021) (“In the United States, a small but vital
stream of safety and efficacy data on prescription drugs is unearthed via discovery in tort and
other litigation.”); see also Adam D.K. Abelkop, Tort Law as an Environmental Policy
Instrument, 92 OR. L. REV. 381, 445-51 (2013) (discussing the role of tort law in gathering
information in the context of environmental regulation). For a discussion of information
problems within FDA-regulated industries, see Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When
Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. 4, 43-45 (2006); and Jacqueline Fox,
Reinvigorating the Concept of Benefit: The Failure of Drug Company-Sponsored Research
on Human Subjects, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 605, 607 (2008).
231
See infra Section III.H.
232
See infra Section III.H.
233
Cynthia Hathaway, A Patent Extension Proposal to End the Underrepresentation of
Women in Clinical Trials and Secure Meaningful Drug Guidance for Women, 67 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 143, 144 (2012).
234
Karen H. Rothenberg, Gender Matters: Implications for Clinical Research and
Women’s Health Care, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1237 (1996); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
EDUC., & WELFARE, GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF DRUGS 10
(1977) (“In general, women of childbearing potential should be excluded from the earliest
dose ranging studies.”).
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extrapolated and applied to the remainder of the population.”235 While FDA has
since changed its guidance, and the National Revitalization Act of 1993 now
requires that the Director of the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) ensure the
participation of women and minority groups in NIH-funded research, disparities
remain.236 A 2010 Institute of Medicine report states that “[a] lack of taking
account of sex and gender differences in the design and analysis of studies, and
a lack of reporting on sex and gender differences, has hindered identification of
potentially important sex differences and slowed progress in women’s health
research and its translation to clinical practice.”237 People of color have been,
and continue to be, underrepresented in clinical trials.238 But gender bias is not
limited to clinical research; it “extends . . . into all areas of health care: ‘it
pervades medicine, beginning with medical-school admissions and education,
encompassing research facilities and medical journals, and culminating in how
women are treated as patients in clinics, hospitals, and physicians’ offices across
the country[,]’”239 as does racial bias and discrimination.240 Many groups of
color experience significant barriers to accessing care, receive lower-quality

235
Vicki Lawrence MacDougall, Medical Gender Bias and Managed Care, 27 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 781, 809 (2002) (examining the gender gap in medicine and discussing gender
gaps in medical and scientific research).
236
See Guideline for the Study and Evaluation of Gender Differences in the Clinical
Evaluation of Drugs, 58 Fed. Reg. 39406 (July 22, 1993); see also National Institutes of
Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, sec. 131, § 429B(a)(1)(A), 107 Stat.
122, 133 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 289a-2); NIH Guidelines on the Inclusion of
Women and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research, 59 Fed. Reg. 14508 (Mar. 28, 1994).
237
COMM. ON WOMEN’S HEALTH RSCH., BD. ON POPULATION HEALTH & PUB. HEALTH
PRAC., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., WOMEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH: PROGRESS,
PITFALLS, AND PROMISE 10 (2010).
238
See, e.g., SOC’Y FOR WOMEN’S HEALTH RSCH. & U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. OFF. OF
WOMEN’S HEALTH, DIALOGUES ON DIVERSIFYING CLINICAL TRIALS: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES
FOR ENGAGING WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN CLINICAL TRIALS i-ii (2011) [hereinafter
DIVERSIFYING
CLINICAL
TRIALS],
https://www.fda.gov/media/84982/download
[https://perma.cc/8SVM-QHES]; Luther T. Clark, Laurence Watkins, Ileana L. Piña, Mary
Elmer, Ola Akinboboye, Millicent Gorham, Brenda Jamerson, Cassandra McCullough,
Christine Pierre, Adam B. Polis, Gary Puckrein & Jeanne M. Regnante, Increasing Diversity
in Clinical Trials: Overcoming Critical Barriers, 44 CURRENT PROBS. CARDIOLOGY 148, 149
(2019); Isabell Yates, Jennifer Byrne, Susan Donahue, Linda McCarty & Allison Mathews,
Representation in Clinical Trials: A Review on Reaching Underrepresented Populations in
Research, 34 CLINICAL RESEARCHER 1, 4 (2020), https://acrpnet.org/2020/08/10
/representation-in-clinical-trials-a-review-on-reaching-underrepresented-populations-inresearch/ [https://perma.cc/9WWL-H69A].
239
Rothenberg, supra note 234, at 1210 (quoting LESLIE LAURENCE & BETH WEINHOUSE,
OUTRAGEOUS PRACTICES: THE ALARMING TRUTH ABOUT HOW MEDICINE MISTREATS WOMEN
5 (1994)).
240
See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL
AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE 29-31 (Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne Y. Stith & Alan
R. Nelson eds., 2003); Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 197, at 688 n.139 (citing literature
on people of color receiving inferior healthcare treatment).
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care, face greater risk of poor health outcomes, and suffer higher mortality than
Whites.241
Arguably, the limitations of the cosmetic regulatory system are more
concerning when viewed against the backdrop of the medical and healthcare
system, where gender and racial bias and discrimination may shape the care—
or lack thereof—that injured women may receive. Women are disadvantaged as
consumers by the inadequate regulation of cosmetics and as patients in the
healthcare system. Removing the possibility of redress for injuries caused by
cosmetics through the tort law system—as the preemption of state tort law in the
cosmetic context would—arguably heightens this concern. However, tort law is
not a panacea.
2. Gender & Racial Injustice & Tort Law
Like the regulatory system and the healthcare system, the tort law system—
as part of the American judicial system—has been shaped by, and has helped
perpetuate, bias and discrimination against women and members of other
historically excluded groups. For example, while women and people of color are
no longer barred from bringing lawsuits because of their race and gender,242
certain groups may have a more difficult time accessing, and be less likely to
access, the civil legal system than others. For example, “attorneys may be less
likely to take the case of a woman or minority on a contingency fee basis because
the potential recovery would be less.”243 “[A]ccess to the legal system, including
241
DIVERSIFYING CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 238, at ii; Pamela A. Meyer, Paula W. Yoon
& Rachel B. Kaufmann, Introduction: CDC Health Disparities & Inequalities Report—
United States, 2013, 62 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (SUPP.) 3, 3 (2013); Ronald
Wyatt, Pain and Ethnicity, 15 VIRTUAL MENTOR 449, 450 (2013); Samantha Artiga & Kendal
Orgera, Key Facts on Health and Health Care by Race and Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.kff.org/report-section/key-facts-on-health-and-health-care-byrace-and-ethnicity-coverage-access-to-and-use-of-care/ [https://perma.cc/M5K2-J298]; Liz
Hamel, Lunna Lopes, Cailey Muñana, Samantha Artiga & Mollyann Brodie, KFF/The
Undefeated Survey on Race and Health, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://www.kff.org/report-section/kff-the-undefeated-survey-on-race-and-health-mainfindings/#HealthCareSystem [https://perma.cc/7AFQ-2JC7]; Nambi Ndugga & Samantha
Artiga, Disparities in Health and Health Care: 5 Key Questions and Answers, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (May 11, 2021), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issuebrief/disparities-in-health-and-health-care-5-key-question-and-answers/
[https://perma.cc/RE7A-TXGT]; Racial Equity and Heath Data Dashboard, KAISER FAM.
FOUND., https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/dashboard/racial-equity-andhealth-data-dashboard/ [https://perma.cc/AAK2-UEBS] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
242
Chamallas, supra note 193, at 463-64.
243
Christian E. Schlegel, Comment, Is a Federal Cap on Punitive Damages in Our Best
Interest?: A Consideration of H.R. 956 in Light of Tennessee’s Experience, 69 TENN. L. REV.
677, 698 (2002); see also Anita Bernstein, Gender in Asbestos Law: Cui Bono? Cui Pacat?,
88 TUL. L. REV. 1211, 1239 (2014); Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of
Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 489-90 (2005); Joanna M.
Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and Activity
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the courts, continues to be a major obstacle for women of color”244—one of the
groups that the inadequate regulation of cosmetics may disproportionately
impact. Unequal access to the legal system may undermine the deterrent effect
of tort law and create incentives for companies to take less care when it comes
to groups that have less access to the legal system.
The types of injuries and damages associated with women and people of color
have been devalued within tort law,245 just as cosmetics and their regulation may
have been devalued and deprioritized due to cosmetics’ close association with
femininity and women.246 When women and people of color do access the tort
law system, they may receive smaller awards than White men247:
When it comes time for the calculation of awards, courts have embraced
the use of work-life expectancy and wage tables constructed separately for
men and women and for whites and blacks[, despite] the racial and gender
disparities that result—including “discounting” awards in particular cases
on account of a plaintiff’s race or gender—and the fact that the use of such
tables reifies existing structural inequalities and historical patterns of
participation in the workforce . . . .248
“Young female and minority tort victims”—the same people who may face the
most risk because of the inadequate regulation of cosmetics—“bear the
particular brunt of the effects of” this.249 In addition, tort reforms may have a

Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 945 (2008) [hereinafter Shepherd, Winners and Losers]
(stating that certain tort reforms will have disproportionate impact on women); Joanna
Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical Liability System, 67 VAND.
L. REV. 151, 175 (2014) (“[T]ort reforms . . . disproportionately reduce contingent fee
lawyers’ willingness to represent lower-income groups.”).
244
Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the Construction of Multiple
Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 463, 498 (1996);
see also Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV.
1263, 1268 (2016) (“[B]lack respondents . . . were less likely than white respondents to have
sought, or considered seeking, legal help for their civil legal problems.”).
245
See generally Chamallas, supra note 193, at 464 (examining how “formal equality on
the face of the law of torts bears little connection to gender and race equity as measured by
real-world standards”).
246
Boyd, supra note 6, at 307.
247
See, e.g., Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 197, at 664 (stating that “the damages black
women receive for future losses caused by bodily injury or wrongful death are lower than the
damages their white male counterparts would receive”); see also Martha Chamallas,
Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation:
A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 75 (1994) (examining gender and race
bias in the calculation of damages in tort law).
248
Catherine M. Sharkey, Valuing Black and Female Lives: A Proposal for Incorporating
Agency VSL into Tort Damages, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1479, 1485 (2021); see also
Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 197, at 670, 673-77 (discussing how use of worklife
expectancy and wage tables has “infused race and gender bias into damage calculations”).
249
Sharkey, supra note 248, at 1486.
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disparate impact on women and people of color, further exacerbating existing
disparities.250
D.

Why Both Federal Regulation & State Tort Law Are Needed

The gender and race-related disparities in tort law and the healthcare system
may intersect and reinforce each other in ways that are particularly detrimental
to those who also disproportionately bear the risk of harm under the inadequate
cosmetic regulatory system251—a system that has lagged behind that of food,
drugs, and medical devices, in part because cosmetics are a gendered product
and industry.252 For example, as discussed in Section II.A, the failures of the
cosmetic regulatory system may disproportionately impact Black women who
may be at higher risk of injury from cosmetics. If a defective or unreasonably
dangerous cosmetic injures a Black woman and she seeks medical care, she does
so in a system in which Black patients are more likely to receive a lower quality
of care and “healthcare providers[] underestimate the severity of Black people’s
injuries.”253 And if she then seeks redress for her injury through the tort

250
See, e.g., Joanne Doroshow & Amy Widman, The Racial Implications of Tort Reform,
25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 161, 161 (2007) (examining how “racial prejudice lurks behind the
tort reform movement”); Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort
Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847, 865 (1997) (“Damage caps on medical malpractice
recoveries will also fall most heavily on the gendered injury categories of sexual assault,
reproductive harm, and cosmetic injuries.” (emphasis added)); Lucinda M. Finley, The
Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263,
1264-67 (2004) (noting the effects of damages caps); Koenig & Rustad, supra note 170, at 311 (highlighting falsity of gender-neutrality in tort law); Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side
of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 761 (1996) (noting
that race matters when it comes to tort claims); Schlegel, supra note 243, at 697-98; Sharkey,
supra note 243, at 490; Shepherd, Winners and Losers, supra note 243, at 945-60 (discussing
disproportionate impacts of tort reforms on women and noting that “punitive damages
typically have been awarded for injuries suffered almost exclusively by women”).
251
For a discussion of how gender bias in the health care and judicial system may interact,
see Cecilia Plaza, Miss Diagnosis: Gendered Injustice in Medical Malpractice Law, 39
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 91, 139 (2020), which notes that it “adds to the current body of
research by showing that there is a gendered injustice in both the medical and the legal fields
and the gender imbalance in each field reinforces the other,” and also see MacDougall, supra
note 235, at 787, which argues that “gender discrepancies in medical practices are more of a
societal concern when the safety net of the judicial system is lacking.”
252
Boyd, supra note 6, at 280, 318-19. Gender, however, cannot be separated from other
factors such as race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and socioeconomic status, which intersect
with and shape women’s experiences. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection
of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 615 (1990).
253
Maytal Gilboa, The Color of Pain: Racial Bias in Pain and Suffering Damages, 56 GA.
L. REV.
(forthcoming
2021)
(manuscript
at
5),
https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3810779; see also Salimah H. Meghani, Eeeseung Byun &
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system—a system that is plagued by disparities—she may receive a smaller
award as a result of her race and gender.254 She may also be awarded lower pain
and suffering damages as a result of her race and gender. 255 The lower damages
awards may create “incentives for defendants to direct risky and harmful
conduct toward minority communities,” further exacerbating existing
disparities.256
Despite these serious limitations, I contend that preempting tort law and
removing it from this equation would make cosmetics less safe for everyone
while also failing to alleviate—and perhaps even exacerbating—the
disproportionate effects that the regulatory inadequacies may have on some
groups. Tort law can help to strengthen and fill gaps in the regulatory system
and vice versa. If state law cosmetic claims were preempted, the woman in the
hypothetical above would be left without even the possibility of redress,
recognition, or compensation that the tort system may provide, thus
compounding the dignitary harms and perpetuating the financial ones. The
regulatory system, while permitting public participation, does not provide the
same possibilities, redress, and recognition as the tort system.257 As discussed
earlier, the federal regulatory system provides no private right of action,258 and
has not generally provided a mechanism to compensate injured people absent
special circumstances.259 When a defective or unreasonably dangerous cosmetic
injures a person, the losses should fall on those responsible for the products
instead of remaining on a faultless injured consumer.
The preemption of cosmetic claims would remove even the possibility of tort
liability, and with it, any future deterrent effect that it may provide. It also may
reduce the availability of cosmetic safety information, which tort litigation, and
specifically civil discovery, may reveal—information that could inform future
regulatory actions and potentially help prevent future harms.260
Rollin M. Gallagher, Time to Take Stock: A Meta-Analysis and Systemic Review of Analgesic
Treatment Disparities for Pain the United States, 13 PAIN MED. 150, 170 (2012) (concluding,
in a meta-analysis of twenty years of studies on racial and ethnic disparities in pain treatment,
that “Blacks/African Americans . . . were at particularly greater risk for undertreatment” and
that “[t]hese findings unequivocally point to the evidence that race and ethnicity matters in
clinical pain treatment outcomes and the size of the difference is sufficiently large to warrant
clinical safety and quality concerns”).
254
See supra Section II.C.2.
255
Gilboa, supra note 253 (manuscript at 6).
256
Sharkey, supra note 248, at 1489; see also Gilboa, supra note 253 (manuscript at 6).
257
In addition, the regulatory system may suffer from other limitations, including agency
capture, limited authority, and insufficient funding. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Due
Process Preempted: Stealth Preemption as a Consequence of Agency Capture, 65 NYU ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 449, 458 (2010); Carl Tobias, FDA Regulatory Compliance Reconsidered, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1020 (2008); supra Section I.C.1.b.
258
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 310, 21 U.S.C. § 337.
259
See supra Section II.B.2.
260
See Abelkop, supra note 230, at 445-51 (discussing importance of tort law for
information gathering in context of environmental regulation); supra Sections I.C.1.b, II.B.4.
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At the same time, tort law is not a panacea. Its ability to protect and
compensate women and people of color has significant limitations, which may
undermine its ability to provide redress, recognition, and compensation. As a
result of these limitations, manufacturers of unreasonably dangerous cosmetics
may not be held accountable for the true cost of the injuries that their products
cause, undermining the incentives for them to take due care. Moreover, while
tort law may still have some (prospective) deterrent effect, it is still primarily
focused on providing redress after an injury has occurred. As a result of these
limitations, tort law does not eliminate the need for a well-functioning regulatory
system.
III. THE COSMETIC-TALC LITIGATION: INGHAM V. JOHNSON & JOHNSON
Building on the discussion in the prior Part, this Part considers Ingham v.
Johnson & Johnson, a recent case in which the plaintiffs alleged that cosmetictalc body powders with asbestos caused their ovarian cancer. This Part situates
its examination of Ingham within a broader discussion of FDA regulation,
gender, race, and disparities in health, healthcare, and tort law and considers how
preempting cases involving cosmetic claims may raise equity concerns.
At the outset, it is important to note that while Ingham has been decided, much
of the litigation over cosmetic-talc products is ongoing, and there are important
unresolved and disputed questions, including whether the products contained
asbestos and whether the products can cause ovarian cancer as plaintiffs have
alleged, as well as the ultimate issue of liability.261 Nevertheless, this Part
261
For a discussion of talc litigation, including litigation alleging talc products contained
asbestos, see, for example, 4 LAWRENCE G. CETRULO, TOXIC TORTS LITIGATION GUIDE ch. 46,
Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2020) and Joseph J. Welter & Jason A. Botticelli, Cosmetic
Talc Litigation: Two Emerging and Distinct Mass Torts, TOXIC TORTS & ENV’T L. COMM.
NEWSL., Summer 2017, at 7, 20. While this Article focuses on claims alleging that cosmetictalc products caused ovarian cancer and the particular impacts on women, men have also made
claims involving cosmetic-talc products. See, e.g., McNeal v. Autozone Inc., No. BC698965
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 2018); see also Craig Clough, LA Jury Hits Talc Supplier with $4.8
Million Asbestos Verdict, LAW360 (Apr. 19, 2021, 10:49 PM), https://www.law360.com
/articles/1376512/la-jury-hits-talc-supplier-with-4-8-million-asbestos-verdict
(discussing
McNeal and stating that according to the firm representing the plaintiff, “Vietnam War veteran
Willie McNeal Jr. suffers from pleural mesothelioma, a cancer of the lungs caused by asbestos
exposure, and convinced the jury to link Whittaker [(a talc supplier)] to his diagnosis due to
his 22-year daily use of Old Spice Talcum Powder”). In addition, it should be noted that in
October 2021, Johnson & Johnson announced that its newly created subsidiary LTL
Management LLC had filed for bankruptcy protection. Press Release, Johnson & Johnson,
Johnson & Johnson Takes Steps to Equitably Resolve All Current and Future Talc Claims
(Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.jnj.com/johnson-johnson-takes-steps-to-equitably-resolve-allcurrent-and-future-talc-claims [https://perma.cc/85AM-UWJG]; see also Voluntary Petition
for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re LTL Mgmt. LLC, No. 21-30589 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. Oct. 14, 2021), transferred, No. 21-30589 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2021). In a press
release announcing that filing, Johnson & Johnson stated that the subsidiary “was established
to hold and manage claims in the cosmetic talc litigation.” Press Release, Johnson & Johnson,
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provides an examination of how many of the considerations discussed earlier
may apply in the context of talc-containing cosmetics.
A.

Talc & Asbestos

Talc is “a naturally occurring mineral” used in cosmetics.262 It is used, for
example, “to absorb moisture, to prevent caking, to make facial makeup opaque,
or to improve the feel of a product.”263 There is the potential for talc to be
contaminated with asbestos, another “naturally occurring silicate mineral” that
“may be found in close proximity [to talc] in the earth.”264 Following reports of
asbestos in talc-containing cosmetics, FDA sampled a number of talc-containing
cosmetics and had them tested.265 In 2019, FDA announced that products from
several different distributors and manufacturers tested positive for asbestos.266
The Interagency Working Group on Asbestos in Consumer Products
(“IWGACP”) has indicated that talc is “the presumptive source of asbestos” in
talc-containing cosmetics.267 However, questions about the possible
contamination of talc with asbestos are not new. FDA notes that such questions
“have been raised since the 1970s.”268
Asbestos is a known carcinogen when inhaled.269 FDA and other federal
agencies have recognized “that there is no known safe level of asbestos

supra. When this Article was finalized, the bankruptcy case was pending. Voluntary Petition
for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re LTL Mgmt. LLC, No. 21-30589 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. Oct. 14, 2021), ECF No. 1, transferred, No. 21-30589 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 16,
2021).
262
See Talc, supra 100.
263
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id.
266
FDA Summary of Results from Testing of Official Samples of Talc-Containing
Cosmetics for Asbestiform Fibers by AMA Laboratories During FY19, U.S. FDA [hereinafter
FDA Summary of Results], https://www.fda.gov/media/135911/download [https://perma.cc
/26BA-JLH9] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
267
See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS ON TESTING METHODS
FOR ASBESTOS IN TALC AND CONSUMER PRODUCTS CONTAINING TALC 1 & n.1 (2020)
[hereinafter
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY],
https://www.fda.gov/media/134005/download
[https://perma.cc/T6E9-7E72] (“The recommendations and opinions expressed in this
document are based on discussions on matters of ‘scientific debate’ (contentious issues that
have not been completely resolved or finalized in the ongoing debate) among subject matter
experts on the IWGACP and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of their
agencies.”).
268
Talc, supra note 100.
269
See, e.g., AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, PUB. HEALTH SERV.,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR ASBESTOS 7 (2001),
https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ToxProfiles/tp61.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U7D-XH7N] (stating the
Department of Health and Human Services, Environmental Protection Agency, and
International Agency for Research on Cancer have all “determined that asbestos is
carcinogenic to humans”).
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exposure.”270 Asbestos exposure can cause asbestosis or pleural plaques and
may cause cancers and mesothelioma.271
The International Agency for Research on Cancer (“IARC”) Working Group
on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans has stated that there is a
causal association between exposure to asbestos and ovarian cancer.272 FDA,
however, states that while “[p]ublished scientific literature going back to the
1960s has suggested a possible association between the use of powders
containing talc in the genital area and the incidence of ovarian cancer[,] . . . these
studies have not conclusively demonstrated such a link, or if such a link existed,
what risk factors might be involved.”273
B.

Cosmetic-Talc Litigation: Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson

In their 2020 annual reports, several companies indicated that they are facing
a number of plaintiffs in products liability lawsuits related to talc body
powders.274 Johnson & Johnson indicated that it was facing approximately

270
Press Release, U.S. FDA, FDA in Brief: FDA Releases Final Report of Talc-Containing
Cosmetic Products Tested for Asbestos (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/fda-brief/fda-brief-fda-releases-final-report-talc-containing-cosmetic-products-testedasbestos [https://perma.cc/S4T3-G7EM]; see also EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 267, at
1.
271
See COMM. ON ASBESTOS: SELECTED HEALTH EFFECTS, BD. ON POPULATION HEALTH &
PUB. HEALTH PRACS., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ASBESTOS: SELECTED CANCERS
15-16, 81-82, 230-31 (2006); 100C INT’L AGENCY FOR RSCH. ON CANCER (IARC), WORLD
HEALTH ORG., ARSENIC, METALS, FIBRES, AND DUSTS: A REVIEW OF HUMAN CARCINOGENS
233-41 (2012) [hereinafter MONOGRAPH 100C]; see also EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note
267, at 1-2; FDA Issues Update Regarding Information Presented at Talc Public Meeting,
U.S. FDA (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/food/cfsan-constituent-updates/fda-issuesupdate-regarding-information-presented-talc-public-meeting
[https://perma.cc/XT2HTPHA].
272
See MONOGRAPH 100C, supra note 271, at 256 (“The Working Group noted that a
causal association between exposure to asbestos and cancer of the ovary was clearly
established . . . .”).
273
Talc, supra note 100; see also 93 INT’L AGENCY FOR RSCH. ON CANCER (IARC), WORLD
HEALTH ORG., IARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO
HUMANS: CARBON BLACK, TITANIUM DIOXIDE AND TALC 412 (2010) [hereinafter WHO,
CARCINOGENIC
RISKS
TO
HUMANS],
https://monographs.iarc.who.int/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/mono93.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y7B-CUEF] (stating “[p]erineal use
of talc-based body powder is possibly carcinogenic to humans”); Ovarian Cancer Risk
Factors, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.cancer.org/cancer/ovariancancer/causes-risks-prevention/risk-factors.html [https://perma.cc/D793-2HE3].
274
See Johnson & Johnson, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 84-86 (Feb. 22, 2021); see also
Bausch Health Cos., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-66 to F-69 (Feb. 18, 2021);
Colgate-Palmolive Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 23 (Jan. 31, 2021).
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25,000 plaintiffs with direct claims in pending lawsuits with respect to body
powders containing talc.275 One such case was Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson.276
Ingham was initially brought in Missouri state court.277 The plaintiffs
included twenty-two women (or their estates), and the spouses of some of the
women.278 The plaintiffs’ allegations included that the “Defendants have known
for decades that ‘Johnson’s Baby Powder’ and ‘Shower to Shower’ contain
asbestos fibers . . . , asbestiform fibers . . . , and other dangerous carcinogens,
and that these carcinogens cause ovarian cancer.”279 They sought recovery “as a
result of developing ovarian cancer,” which they alleged, “was directly and
proximately caused by such wrongful conduct by Defendants, the unreasonably
dangerous and defective nature of the PRODUCTS and the attendant effects of
developing ovarian cancer.”280 The plaintiffs’ claims included, among others,
strict liability for failure to warn,281 negligence,282 breach of express warranty

275

Johnson & Johnson, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 85 (Feb. 22, 2021). Lawsuits
against the company with respect to talc containing powders have been filed in state and
federal courts. See id. at 88. The annual report indicates that “[t]he majority . . . are pending
in federal court, organized into a multi-district litigation (MDL) in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey.” Id. at 86; see also In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F.
Supp. 3d 116, 128 (D.N.J. 2020); Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Litigation, U.S. DIST.
CT. FOR THE DIST. OF N.J., https://www.njd.uscourts.gov/johnson-johnson-talcum-powderlitigation [https://perma.cc/QD26-3LR4] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022). A transfer order for the
MDL states that all of the actions at issue “share common factual questions arising out of
allegations that perineal use of Johnson & Johnson’s talcum powder products can cause
ovarian or uterine cancer in women” and that “[a]ll the actions involve factual questions
relating to the risk of cancer posed by talc and talc-based body powders, whether the
defendants knew or should have known of this alleged risk, and whether defendants provided
adequate instructions and warnings with respect to the products.” Transfer Order, In re
Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Prods. Mktg., 220 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1357 (J.P.M.L.
2016), ECF No. 134. As noted earlier, some verdicts for plaintiffs have been overturned on
appeal. See Johnson & Johnson, supra, at 86.
276
No. 4:17-cv-01857, 2017 WL 3034696 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2017).
277
See id. at *1 (noting that case was initially filed in Missouri state court on August 20,
2015).
278
The plaintiffs’ initial petition named eighty-two plaintiffs. See Ingham v. Johnson &
Johnson, 608 S.W.3d 663, 667 n.1, 724 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020) (noting, however, that “[o]nly
twenty-two plaintiffs and their spouses [went] to trial”), reh’g and/or transfer denied, (July
28, 2020), transfer denied, (Nov. 3, 2020), and cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2716 (2021).
279
Fifth Amended Petition para. 2, at 4, Ingham, No. 1522-cc-10417-01, 2018 WL
3005245 (Mo. Cir. Ct. filed June 5, 2018).
280
Id. para. 5, at 6. The petition named Johnson & Johnson, Johnson & Johnson Consumer
Companies, Inc., and Imerys Talc America, Inc., as defendants. Id. at 4. Imerys Talc America,
Inc., which had supplied the talc in the products, settled before trial. See Imerys Unit Settles
Talc Claims for at Least $5 Million: Bloomberg, REUTERS (June 1, 2018, 11:26 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-imerys-cancer-lawsuit/imerys-unit-settles-talc-claimsfor-at-least-5-million-bloomberg-idUSKCN1IX5D3 [https://perma.cc/6549-CWYM].
281
Fifth Amended Petition, supra note 279, paras. 105-15, at 40-43.
282
Id. paras. 116-29, at 43-47.

2022]

PREEMPTION & GENDER & RACIAL (IN)EQUITY

217

and breach of implied warranties,283 and negligent misrepresentation.284 The jury
returned verdicts for the plaintiffs based on strict liability and negligence;
assessed “punitive damages” and “damages for aggravating circumstances”;285
and awarded the plaintiffs $4.69 billion in damages, of which $4.14 billion were
in punitive damages.286 The defendants moved for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict on all of the plaintiffs’ claims, which the state trial court denied.287
On appeal, the state appellate court reduced the award to $2.2 billion, finding
that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction for some nonresident plaintiffs.288
The Missouri Supreme Court declined to review the decision.289 The defendants
then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which
was also denied.290

283
The Plaintiffs brought these claims only against the Johnson & Johnson defendants. Id.
paras. 130-39, at 47-49.
284
Id. paras. 154-60, at 54-55.
285
See, e.g., Verdict, Agreement and Settlement at 29-31, 44-46, Ingham v. Johnson &
Johnson, No. 1522-cc-10417-01, 2018 WL 3493338 (Mo. Cir. Ct. filed July 12, 2018); see
also Verdict at 3, 6, Ingham, No. 1522-cc-10417-01, 2018 WL 3493335 (Mo. Cir. Ct. filed
July 12, 2018).
286
See, e.g., Tiffany Hsu, Johnson & Johnson Loses Bid to Overturn Verdict, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2018, at B2.
287
Order Denying Defendants’ Post Trial Motions at 1, 10, Ingham, No. 1522-cc-1041701, 2018 WL 7960293 (Mo. Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 19, 2018). In denying the motion, the court
noted that it had previously considered Defendants’ preemption argument on the issue of the
Plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims and found they were not preempted. Id. at 4.
288
Ingham, 608 S.W.3d 663, 724 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020) (entering judgment for $625 million
in total actual damages, $900 million in punitive damages against Johnson & Johnson
Consumer Companies, Inc., and almost $716 million in punitive damages against Johnson &
Johnson), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2716 (2021).
289
Id.
290
See id.; Ingham, 141 S. Ct. 2716, 2716 (2021) (denying certiorari).
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Preemption

Defendants in cases concerning cosmetic talc, including Ingham, have raised
preemption as a defense.291 In one case, Feinberg v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,292
the New York County Supreme Court considered the express preemption
provision in section 379s of the United States Code (section 752 of the
FDCA).293 Feinberg involved a personal injury action in which the plaintiff
claimed her injury was a result of her alleged exposure to asbestos in talcum
powder.294 The New York County Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion
to dismiss on the basis that the express preemption clause in section 379s did not
apply retroactively.295 However, it noted in the course of its analysis that the
“saving clause” in section 379s “expressly permits Plaintiff’s products liability
claims” and “demonstrates Congressional intent not to impair such preexisting
rights.”296
The New York court also considered whether there was “any specific [state]
requirement relating to the same aspect of such cosmetic as a requirement
specifically applicable to that particular cosmetic or class of cosmetics under
[the FDCA] for packaging or labeling.”297 The state court concluded that FDA’s
denial of a citizen petition seeking an asbestos warning on cosmetic talc was not
such a requirement.298 Finally, the court also rejected the defendant’s implied
preemption argument that “requiring a warning on its talc products would
obstruct the purposes and objectives of the FDA’s labeling requirements” as
without merit.299
291
See Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.’s Motion
and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict at
36, Ingham, No. 1522-cc-10417-01, 2018 WL 7079682 (Mo. Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 20, 2018)
(arguing that “Defendants are . . . entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to
plaintiffs’ claims for failure to warn because they are preempted”); see also Order, supra note
287, at 4 (“This Court has previously considered Defendants’ preemption argument on this
issue and found that Plaintiffs’ claims were not preempted.”); Defendants Johnson & Johnson
and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.’s Motion for Directed Verdict at the Close of
Plaintiffs’ Case at 1, Ingham, No. 1522-cc-10417-01, 2018 WL 3446972 (Mo. Cir. Ct. filed
June 27, 2018) (arguing that “[t]he Johnson & Johnson Defendants are entitled to a directed
verdict on plaintiffs’ claims because the claims are preempted”); Johnson & Johnson v. Fitch
ex rel. State, 2019-IA-00033-SCT (¶ 29), 315 So. 3d 1017, 1025 (Miss. 2021) (holding, in a
case brought by the Mississippi Attorney General under the Mississippi Consumer Protection
Act, that the state’s claim was not barred by express or implied preemption “because of the
lack of any specific requirement by the [FDA]”).
292
Feinberg v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 190070/11, 2012 WL 954271 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 22, 2012).
293
Id. at *1.
294
Id.
295
Id. at *2-3.
296
Id. at *2, *9.
297
Id. at *6 (first alteration in original) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 379s(c)).
298
Id.
299
Id. at *10.
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FDA & (A Lack of) Regulation of Cosmetic-Talc Products

The products at issue in Ingham that the plaintiffs’ alleged caused their
injuries contained talcum powder (i.e., talc).300 Talc body powders meet the
definition of “cosmetic” discussed in Section I.A because they are “intended to
be rubbed, poured, sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise
applied to the human body or any part thereof for cleansing, beautifying,
promoting attractiveness, or altering the appearance.”301
As cosmetics, talc body powders are regulated under the regulatory
framework for cosmetics, a framework which, as discussed in Section I.C.1.b,
has substantial limitations. There is no premarket approval requirement for
cosmetics.302 Instead, FDA must act to remove a cosmetic from the market if it
is in violation of the FDCA, and the burden of proving that a cosmetic is
adulterated or misbranded, for example, falls on the government.303
In 1983, Phillippe Douillet petitioned FDA to request, among other things, “a
label of warning of the hazardous effects produced by asbestos with the
continuous use of cosmetic talc.”304 FDA denied the petition in 1986.305 In so
doing, FDA noted that in “the early 1970s, FDA became concerned about the
possibility that cosmetic talc did contain significant amounts of [asbestiform
minerals,]” but that “the agency was not able to assess reliably the levels of
asbestiform minerals in cosmetic talc then [sic] in the marketplace.”306 The
agency’s response to the citizen petition also states that it “request[ed] assistance
from the affected industry in developing acceptable analytical procedures,”
which “apparently ha[d] led to considerable improvement in the quality of this
talc” and that “FDA surveillance activities that were conducted in the latter
portion of the 1970s showed that the quality of cosmetic talc had significantly
improved, and that even when asbestos was present, the levels were so low that
no health hazard existed.”307 FDA also noted that it found “several problems
with the information on which” the petitioner had relied.308
300
Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson, 608 S.W.3d 663, 678 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020), reh’g and/or
transfer denied, (July 28, 2020), transfer denied, (Nov. 3, 2020), and cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
2716 (2021).
301
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 201(i), 21 U.S.C. § 321(i).
302
See supra Section I.C.1.
303
See supra Section I.C.1.
304
See Philippe Douillet, Petition Letter to U.S. FDA for Labeling of Warning of the
Hazardous Effects Produced by Asbestos in Cosmetic Talc, FDA00003597 (Nov. 8, 1983),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/assets/usa-health-fda-talc/douilletpetition.pdf [https://perma.cc/EW83-FCMA].
305
See J. W. Swanson, Acting Assoc. Comm’r for Regul. Affs., U.S. FDA, Denial of
Petition of Philippe Douillet, No. 83P-404, at 5 (July 11, 1986),
https://www.factsabouttalc.com/_document/d-7214?id=0000016c-4ab3-d15b-a3eccaf365d40000 [https://perma.cc/XSG7-DHET].
306
Id. at 3.
307
Id. at 4.
308
Id.
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The Cancer Prevention Coalition later petitioned FDA twice to require cancer
warnings on cosmetic-talc products.309 In 1994, the Coalition petitioned FDA to
require “a warning such as . . . . ‘Frequent talc application in the female genital
area increases the risk of ovarian cancer,’” stating that “scientific papers dating
back to the 1960s . . . warn of increased cancer rates resulting from frequent
exposure to cosmetic grade talc.”310 The Coalition petitioned FDA again in
2008, requesting the same.311 FDA denied both petitions.312 In its 2014 denial,
FDA stated that it “did not find that the data submitted presented conclusive
evidence of a causal association between talc use in the perineal area and ovarian
cancer.”313
From 2009 to 2010, FDA surveyed cosmetic talc. Its “survey found no
asbestos fibers or structures.”314 However, FDA noted that the results were
limited because of the nine talc suppliers it identified, only “four complied with
the [survey] request.”315 Because of survey limitations, FDA noted that the
results “do not prove that most or all talc or talc-containing cosmetic products
currently marketed in the United States are likely to be free of asbestos
contamination.”316
As noted earlier, FDA undertook another survey in 2019, following reports of
talc-containing cosmetics containing asbestos. In contrast to its earlier survey,
FDA announced that products from several different distributors and
manufacturers tested positive for asbestos.317 Following the testing, the
limitations of FDA’s cosmetic authority were apparent.318 FDA indicated that
one of the companies that it requested recall products “refused to comply” with

309
See Samuel S. Epstein, Cancer Prevention Coal., Citizen Petition to U.S. FDA Seeking
Carcinogenic Labeling on All Cosmetic Talc Products, FDA00000222 (Nov. 17, 1994)
[hereinafter Carcinogenic Labeling Petition], https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/assets/usa-health-fda-talc/epstein-petition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DA8Q-L4W3];
Samuel S. Epstein, Cancer Prevention Coal., Citizen Petition to U.S. FDA Seeking a Cancer
Warning on Cosmetic Talc Products, FDA.2008.P.0309, at 2 (May 13, 2008) [hereinafter
Cancer Warning Petition] (on file with Boston University Law Review) (referencing the 1994
Citizen Petition submitted by the Cancer Prevention Coalition).
310
Carcinogenic Labeling Petition, supra note 309, at 1.
311
Cancer Warning Petition, supra note 309, at 1.
312
See Steven M. Musser, Deputy Dir. Sci. Operations, Ctr. for Food Safety & Applied
Nutrition, U.S. FDA, Denial of Two Citizen Petitions of Samuel S. Epstein,
Pltf_Misc_00000382, 6 (Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/assets/usa-health-fda-talc/epstein-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL8R-WKLA].
313
Id. at 1.
314
Talc, supra note 100 (select “FDA’s Talc Survey of 2009-2010” dropdown).
315
Id. (select “FDA’s Talc Survey of 2009-2010” dropdown).
316
Id. (select “FDA’s Talc Survey of 2009-2010” dropdown).
317
FDA Summary of Results, supra note 266.
318
Statement from FDA Commissioner, supra note 1 (“These findings serve as an
important reminder that under our current authority, the FDA has only limited tools to ensure
the safety of cosmetics products.”).
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its request and that it “does not have authority to mandate a recall.”319 Several
companies voluntarily recalled products, including ultimately the company that
FDA had indicated initially refused.320 More recently, on February 4, 2020,
“FDA held a public meeting on testing methods for asbestos in talc and cosmetic
products containing talc.”321
E.

Gender, Race & Talc Body Powder

Body powders and their use also reflect how cosmetic use, gender, and race
are intertwined. Body powders have long been specifically marketed to women.
According to the National Museum of American History’s website, pretwentieth century, “[t]alcum powder was sold as a general body freshener and
deodorant” and “advertisers often specifically targeted women, whom they
implied were most at risk for offensive body odors.”322 The advertising reflected
different expectations for women and men: women’s bodies, according to
advertisers, were expected to have “a general ‘sweetness’” and “should be
without body odor”—expectations that did not extend to men.323
The plaintiffs in Ingham alleged that “[t]he bottle of ‘Johnson’s Baby Powder’
specifically targets women, by stating, ‘For you, use every day to help feel soft,
fresh, and comfortable.’”324 In addition, Reuters has reported that in the 1950s
and 1960s Johnson’s Baby Powder was “[l]osing the connection to the product’s
namesake—babies,” following case studies “point[ing] to the dangers of
breathing in talc” and a report “citing the deaths of three children who inhaled
large amounts of talcum powder,” which “left J&J eager to cultivate other
319

Id.
See id.; Press Release, U.S. FDA, Baby Powder Manufacturer Voluntarily Recalls
Products for Asbestos (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/baby-powder-manufacturer-voluntarily-recalls-products-asbestos
[https://perma.cc/JML3-577G]; see also FDA Advises Consumers, supra note 4 (indicating
that Johnson & Johnson, Beauty Plus Global, and Claire’s, Inc., voluntarily recalled some
product).
321
See Public Meeting on Testing Methods for Asbestos in Talc and Cosmetic Products
Containing Talc, U.S. FDA (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/cosmetics-newsevents/public-meeting-testing-methods-asbestos-talc-and-cosmetic-products-containingtalc-02042020-02042020 [https://perma.cc/W3VH-QBR9]. In late 2021, FDA announced the
results of its 2020-2021 sampling of talc-containing cosmetics, indicating that “all 50 samples
tested negative for detectable asbestos” and that FDA will test another 50 samples in 2022.
FDA in Brief: FDA Makes Progress on Efforts to Understand Presence of Asbestos in
Cosmetic Products, U.S. FDA (Oct. 25, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/fda-brief-fda-makes-progress-efforts-understand-presence-asbestoscosmetic-products#:~:text=Additional%20Information,assessed%20were%20negative
%20for%20asbestos [https://perma.cc/3ABP-FGRS].
322
Alleviating Body Odors, SMITHSONIAN INST., https://www.si.edu/spotlight/healthhygiene-and-beauty/alleviating-body-odors#ogmt-edan-search-results
[https://perma.cc/27DB-4J8A] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
323
Id.
324
Fifth Amended Petition, supra note 279, para. 57, at 28.
320
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markets.”325 The article states that “[b]eginning in the 1970s, J&J ran ads clearly
intended to woo young women” and that in 1989, an “advertising
firm . . . submitted a plan to J&J to ‘initiate a high level of usage’ among young
women,” which “would try to convince teen girls that Johnson’s Baby Powder,
‘applied daily after showering, is a simple, feminine way to smell clean and fresh
during the day.’”326 In this way, cosmetic use is both shaped by and shapes
gender.
Body powders may also have been specifically marketed to AfricanAmerican women.327 Reuters reported that “[t]he ‘right place’ to focus,
according to a 2006 internal J&J marketing presentation, was ‘under developed
geographical areas with hot weather, and higher AA population,’ the ‘AA’
325

Chris Kirkham & Lisa Girion, Special Report: As Baby Powder Concerns Mounted,
J&J Focused Marketing on Minority, Overweight Women, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2019, 9:08 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-johnson-marketing-specialrepo/specia
l-report-as-baby-powder-concerns-mounted-jj-focused-marketing-on-minority-overweightwomen-idUSKCN1RL1JZ [https://perma.cc/TC5W-RKZL].
326
Id. (emphasis added).
327
At the time that this Article was written, lawsuits brought by two states against several
companies concerning talc-containing products were pending. See generally Appendix to
Petition of Johnson & Johnson; Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc.; Valeant
Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.; and Valeant Pharmaceuticals North America LLC for
Interlocutory Appeal by Permission, Johnson & Johnson v. Hood ex rel. State, No. 2019-M00033 (Miss. 2019) [hereinafter Appendix to Petition of Johnson & Johnson],
https://www.courts.ms.gov/appellatecourts/docket/sendPDF.php?f=web0001.SCT.2019-M33.9402.0.pdf&c=89527&a=N&s=2 [https://perma.cc/V75A-VN63]; Press Release, New
Mexico Att’y Gen., Attorney General Balderas Files Suit Against Manufacturers of Talcum
Powder (Jan. 2, 2020) [hereinafter Balderas Press Release], https://www.nmag.gov/uploads
/PressRelease/48737699ae174b30ac51a7eb286e661f/AG_Files_Suit_Against_Manufacturer
s_of_Talcum_Powder.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J7J-MDTL] (discussing case pending in New
Mexico and attaching complaint filed by Attorney General Hector H. Balderas). A complaint
filed by the Attorney General of Mississippi alleged violations of the state’s consumer
protection act. Appendix to Petition of Johnson & Johnson, supra, para. 1, at
APPENDIX.0005. The lawsuit alleges that the defendant companies “engaged in
misrepresentations and omissions in connection with the labeling, advertisements, promotion,
marketing, and sale of their Talc Products” and that they “intentionally targeted minority
communities.” Id. paras. 5, 9, at APPENDIX.0006-08 (alleging that “[t]he State has a quasisovereign interest in ensuring that companies do not . . . engage in discriminatory marketing
putting a specific portion of the population at greater risk”). A complaint filed by the Attorney
General of New Mexico alleged violations of various acts of that state and “common law and
equitable causes of action.” Balderas Press Release, supra para. 1, at 1. See generally id.
(reporting that Attorney General’s Office is prepared to take action against corporations that
mislead or endanger its constituents). The lawsuit alleges that “[t]o ‘grow the franchise,’ the
[named] company implemented a strategy of targeting African-American and Hispanic
women,” that “[t]he racially targeted strategy implemented by J&J has and continues to
disproportionately affect the citizens of New Mexico because approximately forty-eight
(48%) of New Mexico’s population is comprised of African-American and Hispanic
individuals,” and that “the companies [named in the lawsuit] that manufacture and sell talc
products have concealed and failed to warn consumers about the dangerous associated with
their Talc Products.” Id. paras. 87-88, at 29-30.
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referring to African-Americans.”328 According to Reuters, the company “turned
those proposals into action.”329
Body powder use may be more common in African-American women than in
other women.330 For example, Ami R. Zota and Bhavna Shamasunder write that
the “[u]se of talc powder on the genitals is [a] practice that is practiced
disproportionately by US African American women.”331 Target marketing may
“foster[] and maintain[] insecurities about body odors—particularly vulvar
odors—among African-American women.”332 Moreover, “the use of vaginal
deodorants such as douche preparations and aerosolized sprays,” practices
which may be seen as cultural norms and an aspect of African American beauty
culture, may have troubling racial implications rooted in “the history of racist
beliefs about the Black body.”333
F.

Ovarian Cancer & Health & Healthcare Disparities

As noted earlier, whether talcum powder use was the cause of the plaintiffs’
ovarian cancer—e.g., as the plaintiffs in Ingham alleged334—is one of the
disputed questions in the context of the cosmetic-talc cases. But setting aside the
328

Kirkham & Girion, supra note 325.
Id. (“[Johnson & Johnson] distributed Baby Powder samples through churches and
beauty salons in African-American and Hispanic neighborhoods, ran digital and print
promotions with weight-loss and wellness company Weight Watchers and launched a
$300,000 radio advertising campaign in a half-dozen markets aiming to reach ‘curvy Southern
women 18-49 skewing African American.’”).
330
Joellen M. Schildkraut, Sarah E. Abbott, Anthony J. Alberg, Elisa V. Bandera, Jill S.
Barnholtz-Sloan, Melissa L. Bondy, Michele L. Cote, Ellen Funkhouser, Lauren C. Peres,
Edward S. Peters, Ann G. Schwartz, Paul Terry, Sydnee Crankshaw, Fabian Camacho,
Frances Wang & Patricia G. Moorman, Association Between Body Powder Use and Ovarian
Cancer: The African American Cancer Epidemiology Study (AACES), 25 CANCER
EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1411, 1416 (2016), (noting a “high prevalence
of exposure to both genital and nongenital body powder among [African American] women
compared with the mostly white subjects”); Britton Trabert, Commentary, Body Powder and
Ovarian Cancer Risk—What Is the Role of Recall Bias?, 25 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY,
BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1369, 1369-70 (2016) (stating that “[t]he prevalence of body
powder use is reported to be higher among African American women than among nonHispanic white women,” but noting possible recall bias as a result of media coverage); Anna
H. Wu, Celeste L. Pearce, Chiu-Chen Tseng & Malcolm C. Pike, African Americans and
Hispanics Remain at Lower Risk of Ovarian Cancer than Non-Hispanic Whites After
Considering Nongenetic Risk Factors and Oophorectomy Rates, 24 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY,
BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1094, 1096 (2015) (“Talc use was more common in AfricanAmerican women . . . than in non-Hispanic Whites . . . or Hispanics . . . .”).
331
Zota & Shamasunder, supra note 34, at 420.
332
Michelle Ferranti, An Odor of Racism: Vaginal Deodorants in African-American
Beauty Culture and Advertising, 11 ADVERT. & SOC’Y REV., no. 4, 2011,
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/407304.
333
Id.
334
See Order, supra note 287, at 3 (holding that the plaintiffs in Ingham satisfied the
standard for causation under Missouri state law).
329
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question of causation for a moment, ovarian cancer can be used to examine
disparities in health and healthcare.
Ovarian cancer is cancer of the female reproductive organs, the ovaries.335 As
a result, it primarily develops in women.336 Research on National Cancer
Institute funding and the Funding to Lethality score for ovarian cancer has found
that ovarian cancer research is “significantly underfunded” compared to other
cancers.337 This may negatively impact the trials available to patients with
ovarian cancer, trial enrollment, and the number of treatment
recommendations.338
There are significant racial disparities in access to ovarian cancer treatment
and outcomes. African American women have a lower ovarian cancer rate than
non-Hispanic White women but a higher death rate.339 For example, one study
found that “differences in access to care” may be “responsible for the widening
of survival differences between African American and White women over
time.”340 In addition, a review found that there was “evidence of continued and
significant disparities in ovarian cancer treatment and mortality, especially
among black patients.”341 The meta-analysis “showed a statistically significant

335
Key Statistics for Ovarian Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.cancer.org/cancer/ovarian-cancer/about/key-statistics.html
[https://perma.cc/72EY-CU6U]. It can also develop in transgender men and other people who
were born with ovaries who do not identify as women. See Ovarian Cancer in Transgender
Men,
NAT’L
LGBT
CANCER
NETWORK,
https://cancer-network.org/cancerinformation/transgendergender-nonconforming-people-and-cancer/ovarian-cancer-intransgender-men/ [https://perma.cc/UG3K-LYUV] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (explaining
risks of ovarian cancer for transgender men).
336
Key Statistics for Ovarian Cancer, supra note 335.
337
Ryan J. Spencer, Laurel W. Rice, Clara Ye, Kaitlin Woo & Shitanshu Uppal,
Disparities in the Allocation of Research Funding to Gynecologic Cancers by Funding to
Lethality Scores, 152 GYNECOLOGIC ONCOLOGY 106, 107 (2019).
338
Id. at 108. This may also impact potential plaintiffs’ ability to establish the cause of
their ovarian cancer in product liability cases. See Rachael Casey & Timothy P. Larkin,
Ovarian Cancer and ‘Tainted Talc’: What Treating Physicians Need to Know, 116 MO. MED.
83, 84 (2019) (postulating that the “less-than-compelling scientific record” linking talc to
ovarian cancer may be “the reason for the recent shift in litigation strategy” towards blaming
ovarian cancer on asbestos). See generally Leslie I. Boden & David Ozonoff, LitigationGenerated Science: Why Should We Care?, 116 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. 117 (2008)
(discussing courts’ general preference for existing science over “litigation-generated
science”).
339
Eudocia Lee & Patrick Wen, Gender and Sex Disparity in Cancer Trials, 5 ESMO
OPEN, Aug. 2020, at 3.
340
Mishka Terplan, Nicholas Schluterman, Erica J. McNamara, J. Kathleen Tracy & Sarah
M. Temkin, Have Racial Disparities in Ovarian Cancer Increased Over Time? An Analysis
of SEER Data, 125 GYNECOLOGIC ONCOLOGY 19, 23 (2012).
341
Shama Karanth, Mackenzie E. Fowler, XiHua Mao, Lauren E. Wilson, Bin Huang,
Maria Pisu, Arnold Potosky, Tom Tucker & Tomi Akinyemiju, Race, Socioeconomic Status,
and Health-Care Access Disparities in Ovarian Cancer Treatment and Mortality: Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis, JNCI CANCER SPECTRUM, Oct. 9, 2019, at 10.
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25% reduction in likelihood of guideline-adherent treatment among blacks
compared with whites” and “a statistically significant 18% higher risk of ovarian
cancer mortality compared with whites.”342 At the same time, there has been
limited research on ovarian cancer in African American women,343 and African
American women are less likely than White women to enroll in ovarian cancer
trials.344
Studies of whether there is an association between talc genital powder use and
ovarian cancer have been mixed, and the IARC has identified it as possibly
carcinogenic.345 A study of talc body powder use and ovarian cancer in African
American women “found that the application of genital powder is associated
with serous and nonserous [epithelial ovarian cancer].”346
G.

Gender, Race & Asbestos Litigation

The preemption of state tort law claims in the cosmetic context may also raise
equity concerns given that asbestos claims are gendered and reflect gender- and
race-based disparities in the tort system.
In prior asbestos litigation, “[m]en were disproportionately victimized, being
exposed to asbestos in the military, in shipyards, in mines and in other maleoriented occupations,”347 “occupations from which women were largely
excluded.”348 In contrast, many plaintiffs in the cosmetic-talc cases are
women.349 Whereas asbestos litigation has been described as “exemplif[ying]
342

Id. at 6.
Patricia G. Moorman, Rachel T. Palmieri, Lucy Akushevich, Andrew Berchuck &
Joellen M. Schildkraut, Ovarian Cancer Risk Factors in African-American and White Women,
170 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 598, 598 (2009) (stating that “[d]espite the importance of ovarian
cancer as a major cause of morbidity and mortality, there has been very little research on
ovarian cancer among African Americans”); see also Ovarian Cancer Studies Aim to Reduce
Racial Disparities, Improve Outcomes, NAT’L CANCER INST. (July 16, 2020),
https://www.cancer.gov/news-events/cancer-currents-blog/2020/ovarian-cancer-racialdisparities-studies [https://perma.cc/53YG-3D5U] (stating that “a lack of data on ovarian
cancer among diverse populations has impeded research in this area”).
344
Lee & Wen, supra note 339, at 3.
345
See generally WHO, CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO HUMANS, supra note 273, at 412
(“Perineal use of talc-based body powder is possibly carcinogenic to humans” (emphasis
omitted)); Schildkraut et al., supra note 330; Trabert, supra note 330.
346
Schildkraut et al., supra note 330, at 1416. But see Trabert, supra note 330, at 1369
(“[T]wo prospective cohort studies—which assessed genital powder use prior to cancer
development—did not support increased risk of overall ovarian cancer . . . .”).
347
Koenig & Rustad, supra note 170, at 35.
348
Id. at 36 n.133; see also Michelle J. White, Understanding the Asbestos Crisis 12 (May
2003) (unpublished manuscript), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf
/white.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AGQ-JNBZ] (stating that “virtually all” of the plaintiffs in the
examined asbestos trials were male).
349
See Transfer Order, In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Prods. Mktg., 220 F.
Supp. 3d 1356, 1357 (J.P.M.L. 2016) (noting that the shared factual questions arise out of
343
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male-gendered products liability,”350 the current litigation may be described as
exemplifying female-gendered products liability. For example, in Ingham, the
plaintiffs claimed injuries—ovarian cancer—to part of the female reproductive
system—the ovaries—that they alleged were caused by a highly gendered
product—cosmetics—that they allege had asbestos.351
In a 2014 article, Anita Bernstein describes American male asbestos plaintiffs
being treated with “unprecedented generosity” and “[e]xtraordinary favoritism”
within the tort system and experiencing “extraordinary success.”352 When
women made asbestos claims outside of the cosmetic context—e.g., after
“inhal[ing] fibers that her husband, an asbestos worker, brought home from his
job” while doing his laundry, Bernstein notes, “[c]ourts have almost
unanimously denied [such] claims.”353 Bernstein contends that there are a
variety of gender disparities in asbestos law that are “contrary to the material
interests of women,” including that men and women who suffered comparable
harms did not fare comparably in court.354 Women “fared worse.”355
Asbestos plaintiffs of color fared worse than White plaintiffs in prior asbestos
cases. For example, they are not immune from the race-based disparities in
damages awards that result from the use of race-based life expectancy
statistics.356 For example, in Torts and Discrimination, which was discussed in
Section II.B.2, authors Ronen Avraham and Kimberly Yuracko cite a 1994
asbestos case in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld “the trial
court’s use of a standard life expectancy table particularized to the plaintiff’s
race and gender in calculating life expectancy for future pain and suffering

allegations that use of the “products can cause ovarian or uterine cancer in women” (emphasis
added)); Kirkham & Girion, supra note 325 (“[W]omen . . . make up a large number of the
13,000 plaintiffs alleging that J&J’s [products] . . . caused their ovarian cancer or
mesothelioma.”).
350
Bernstein, supra note 160, at 303.
351
Fifth Amended Petition, supra note 279, paras. 1-2, at 4.
352
Bernstein, supra note 243, at 1214, 1225.
353
Id. at 1216, 1222.
354
Id. at 1213; see also id. at 1225-45 (discussing how men fared better than comparably
harmed women in courts).
355
Id. at 1257.
356
See Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 197, at 672 & n.46.
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damages.”357 Additionally, one study found disparities between people of color
and White plaintiff settlement amounts in asbestos cases.358
H.

How Tort Law May Complement & Reinforce the Regulation of
Cosmetics

Earlier, this Article explored how tort law may complement and reinforce the
regulation of cosmetics.359 This Section returns to that question and considers
what the examination in the current Part, including the examination of Ingham,
adds.
Talc body powders provide an example of how product use may vary by
gender and race and how products may be marketed specifically to women and
people of color.360 When used to control odor, talc body powder is intimately
intertwined with issues of social identity and control of female bodies.361 Against
this backdrop, tort law may help empower women, including those who are
members of other historically excluded groups, by providing the possibility of
redress.
In addition, tort law in the cosmetic context may provide compensation to
injured persons. In Ingham, the twenty women who claimed that the cosmetictalc products at issue caused their ovarian cancer were ultimately awarded a total
of approximately $2.2 billion.362
However, Ingham also reflects one of the limitations of tort law: the inability
of tort law to make a person who suffered an injury whole. The respondents’
lawyers indicated in an April 2021 brief that “[s]ix respondents (represented by
357

Id. (citing Adkins v. Asbestos Corp., 18 F.3d 1349, 1350-51 (6th Cir. 1994)). According
to the U.S. life tables, the life expectancy for a “Non-Hispanic black” one-year-old is 74.5
years, whereas it is 78 years for a “Non-Hispanic white” one-year-old. Elizabeth Arias &
Jiaquan Xu, United States Life Tables, 2018, 69 NAT’L VITAL STATS. REPS., at 3 tbl.A (Nov.
17, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr69/nvsr69-12-508.pdf [https://perma.cc
/Q5W2-28GW]. The life expectancy for females of both races is higher than that of samerace males, with “Non-Hispanic white” females having the highest life expectancy. See id.
While this may tend to increase damages awards for females compared to males, the use of
worklife expectancy tables and wage tables may cut the other way. See Avraham & Yuracko,
supra note 197, at 670-77 (showing how use of life expectancy, worklife expectancy, and
average national wage tables “have infused race and gender bias into damage calculations”).
358
Chamallas, supra note 193, at 465-66; see also CHARLES Z. SMITH, WASHINGTON STATE
MINORITY
&
JUSTICE
TASK
FORCE:
FINAL
REPORT
118-31
(1990),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/TaskForce.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL4W-SQYB]
(finding that “[t]he case settlement data analysis showed that minorities received lower
average settlements than non-minorities,” but that further study is needed).
359
See supra Section II.B.
360
See supra Section III.E.
361
See supra Section III.E; see also Kirkham & Girion, supra note 325 (describing
supposed proper “feminine way to smell”).
362
Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson, 608 S.W.3d 663, 724 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020), reh’g and/or
transfer denied, (July 28, 2020), transfer denied, (Nov. 3, 2020), and cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
2716 (2021).
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their estates) had died from ovarian cancer by the time of trial in th[e] case;
another three have died from it since.”363 They also noted that each of the
respondents would likely die from ovarian cancer.364 The award in Ingham
cannot undo their injuries, and thus compensation cannot truly make them
whole.365
Tort law may also have a deterrent effect. Companies that manufacture
cosmetics may look to the Ingham case and take greater safety precautions to
avoid similar liability. However, whether this is good, depends on, among other
things, whether cosmetic talc is a potentially hazardous substance containing
asbestos as the plaintiffs in Ingham alleged.366 As discussed above, tort law also
has substantial limitations for female and racial minority plaintiffs, including in
the context of cosmetics.367 As a result, tort law may underdeter and “create[] ex
ante incentives for potential tortfeasors that encourage future targeting of
disadvantaged groups.”368 Nevertheless, removing tort law may worsen the
effects of the cosmetic regulatory system’s failures, failures which may also
disproportionately impact women, including those who are members of other
excluded groups.
While much of the cosmetic-talc litigation is ongoing, there is some indication
that it may also reflect the radiating effects of tort law. Various publications
directed toward women and teens have run stories about the litigation or appear
to have been influenced by it.369 For example, Teen Vogue, an online publication

363

Brief in Opposition for Respondents at 2, Ingham, No. 20-1223 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2021).
Id. at 17.
365
See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 558
(2005) (implying that compensation cannot make plaintiff whole again because tort law
“monetiz[es] death”); Sean Hannon Williams, Lost Life and Life Projects, 87 IND. L.J. 1745,
1763 (2012) (describing how “mak[ing] someone whole would require undoing the injury,”
and discussing the challenges which death poses to doing this).
366
Fifth Amended Petition, supra note 279, paras. 1-2.
367
See Chamallas, supra note 193, at 465-66; see also supra Section II.C.2.
368
Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 197, at 666-67.
369
See, e.g., De Elizabeth, A Jury Awarded $4.69 Billion to Women Accusing Johnson &
Johnson of Contributing to Their Ovarian Cancer, TEEN VOGUE (July 15, 2018),
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/jury-469-billion-women-accusing-johnson-johnsonovarian-cancer [https://perma.cc/9EQX-2BQX]; Liz Flora, Talc-Free Is the New ParabenFree, GLOSSY (June 18, 2020), https://www.glossy.co/beauty/talc-free-is-the-new-parabenfree/ [https://perma.cc/7F53-PUWT]; Elizabeth Inglese, Does Baby Powder Contain
Asbestos? What Women Need to Know About Johnson & Johnson’s Ovarian Cancer Lawsuit,
VOGUE (Dec. 16, 2018), https://www.vogue.com/article/talcum-baby-powder-cancer
[https://perma.cc/JM8S-QVFM]; Sarah Kinonen, Johnson & Johnson Was Ordered to Pay a
Record-Setting Verdict to This Cancer Patient, TEEN VOGUE (May 9, 2017),
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/johnson-and-johnson-lawsuit-talc [https://perma.cc/378F9RYB].
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targeted toward young women,370 has run pieces about the litigation.371 As
another example, fashion magazine Elle lists “talc-free beauty” as its number
one category in a piece titled The 2021 ELLE Green Beauty Stars.372 The piece
states that “[t]he 2019 documentary Toxic Beauty examined the connection
between cancer and talcum powder,” which “drove viewers to study the fine
print on their beauty products,” before listing several talc-free cosmetics.373 The
press kit for the film states that it “follows the class action lawsuit against
J&J.”374 Glossy, a “fashion, luxury and technology” publication,375 in a piece
titled Talc-Free Is the New Paraben-Free, quoted the founder of a “clean beauty
brand” as stating, “[t]he reason that specific focus is on this one ingredient
[(talc)] is because of the case that was against Johnson & Johnson. That’s public
knowledge.”376 Public visibility of the cosmetic-talc litigation may, in turn,
impact beauty culture.377 Indeed, several companies have removed talccontaining products from the market or replaced talc with other ingredients.378
Again, whether this is a good thing may depend on, among other things, whether
cosmetic talc is a potentially hazardous substance containing asbestos as the
plaintiffs in Ingham alleged or not.379

370

Teen Vogue, CONDÉ NAST, https://www.condenast.com/brands/teen-vogue/
[https://perma.cc/7QRU-8SUA] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (describing audience as “3.4x
more likely to be women 18-24”).
371
See, e.g., Elizabeth, supra note 369; Kinonen, supra note 369.
372
Margaux Anbouba, The 2021 ELLE Green Beauty Stars, ELLE (Apr. 6, 2021),
https://www.elle.com/beauty/a35905481/elle-green-beauty-stars-2021/
[https://perma.cc/6SKB-A5S7].
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Id.
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AMY SAUDNERS, TOXIC BEAUTY PRESS KIT 2 (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com
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Beauty+Press+Kit_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/V445-UGGG].
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Years, GLOSSY (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.glossy.co/fashion/on-glossys-anniversaryfashion-and-beauty-insiders-predict-the-industries-next-5-years/ [https://perma.cc/MV93CGYJ].
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Flora, supra note 369.
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For an examination of the history of beauty culture, see generally KATHY PEISS, HOPE
IN A JAR: THE MAKING OF AMERICA’S BEAUTY CULTURE (1998) (explaining historical context
of the beauty industry and its role in identity).
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Press Release, Johnson & Johnson, Johnson & Johnson Consumer Health Announces
Discontinuation of Talc-Based Johnson’s Baby Powder in U.S. and Canada (May 19, 2020),
https://www.jnj.com/our-company/johnson-johnson-consumer-health-announcesdiscontinuation-of-talc-based-johnsons-baby-powder-in-u-s-and-canada
[https://perma.cc/LM89-8PE3]; see also Martinne Geller & Lisa Girion, Exclusive: Chanel,
Revlon, L’Oreal Pivoting Away from Talc in Some Products, REUTERS (June 9, 2020, 1:05
AM),
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In addition, some have raised questions about access to information and the
role of corporate influence on science and regulation in the asbestos and talc
contexts.380 The cosmetic-talc litigation provides an example of how litigation
may help to bring product information to light. News sources have reported on
company documents and other information from cosmetic-talc litigation,381 and
a number of the documents from the litigation have been made public.382 Indeed,
Johnson & Johnson has made a number of documents “that have been used as
evidence in trials” available.383
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs’ claims in Ingham provide a lens through which to view the
cosmetic regulatory system, the healthcare system, and the tort system. Viewed
through this lens, I argue that what emerges are three systems that suffer from
substantial limitations when it comes to protecting—or in the case of healthcare,
treating—women and people of color. However, even setting the claims in
Ingham aside, the limitations of these systems are apparent.
Given the intersecting limitations of these systems, I contend that tort law can
provide important benefits in the cosmetic context. Despite its limitations, tort
law may complement and reinforce the regulatory system for cosmetics in ways
that may be particularly important given the gendered nature of cosmetics and
the relationship of these products with race. Tort law may provide redress and
compensation to people injured by cosmetics, encourage members of the
cosmetic industry to take due care, and bring to light information, including
about cosmetic safety, that can inform cosmetic regulation. Accordingly, state
tort law claims in the cosmetic context should not be preempted. Cosmetic
reform is greatly needed as the current regulatory system fails to adequately
protect the health and safety of those who use cosmetics, but in enacting
cosmetic reform, Congress should preserve state tort law claims. Preempting
380
See, e.g., David Eligman, Tess Bird & Caroline Lee, Dust Diseases and the Legacy of
Corporate Manipulation of Science and Law, 20 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENV’T HEALTH
115, 115 (2014); Triet H. Tran, Joan E. Steffen, Kate M. Clancy, Tess Bird & David S.
Egilman, Talc, Asbestos, and Epidemiology: Corporate Influence and Scientific
Incognizance, 30 EPIDEMIOLOGY 783, 783 (2019).
381
See, e.g., Girion, supra note 214; Kirkham & Girion, supra note 325; Roni Caryn Rabin
& Tiffany Hsu, Baby Powder, A Carcinogen, and Red Flags, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2018, at
A1, A22.
382
See, e.g., DOCUMENTCLOUD, https://www.documentcloud.org/app?q=%2Bproject
%3Ajohnson-johnson-40934 (search results for “+project:johnson-johnson-40934”) (last
visited Jan. 17, 2022) (containing documents cited in Girion, supra note 214); BROWN UNIV.
LIBR. DIGIT. REPOSITORY, https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/search/?q=David
+Egilman+Papers (search results for “David Egilman Papers”) (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
383
Johnson
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Disclaimer,
BOX,
https://jjcloud.ent.box.com
/s/2x692lcj24crvjunf0lnu590zw5g528e/file/358022398021 (last visited Jan. 17, 2022); see
also Johnson & Johnson, Facts About Talc, BOX, https://jjcloud.ent.box.com
/s/2x692lcj24crvjunf0lnu590zw5g528e (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (providing Johnson &
Johnson documents related to talc litigations).
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such claims may disproportionately impact women, including women who are
members of other historically excluded groups, and may ultimately make
cosmetics less safe for all.

